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1 Introduction
Today’s Internet is not worthy of the trust society increasingly places in it.
We hear every day about new security vulnerabilities and successful attacks,
ranging from email viruses and Web sites overrun with unwanted traffic, to net-
work outages, compromised user data, and downright espionage. These attacks
are costly, leading to denial of service, loss of revenue, identity theft, ransom
demands, subversion of the democratic process, malfunctioning safety-critical
equipment, and more.
Many successful security attacks use “social engineering” to prey on naive
users, for example by getting them to click on malicious hyperlinks. Users are
often guilty of using easily-guessed passwords, or failing to reset a default pass-
word on a new device. Application software is also the source of many security
vulnerabilities, due to bugs or poor programming practices. Its complexity pro-
vides a big “attack surface” for adversaries to probe for weaknesses.
Despite the prevalence of social engineering and vulnerable applications,
networks are an important part of the security landscape. Networks make at-
tacks on applications possible by delivering unwanted traffic or leaking sensitive
data. Network components and network services are often the targets of attacks.
Sometimes a network itself is the adversary, performing unethical surveillance
or censoring communication.
Fortunately, networks can also be part of the solution, by blocking unwanted
traffic, enabling anonymous communication, circumventing censorship, or pro-
tecting both infrastructure and applications from a range of known attacks. And
network protocols can protect users by authenticating and encrypting commu-
nications.
This article is intended as a concise tutorial on the very large subject of se-
curity by and for networks, specifically the mechanisms through which network
security is achieved. It is intended to be useful to all readers interested in net-
works, whether their specialty is security or not. Because the basic mechanisms
have proven to be fairly stable over time, we do not emphasize which particular
attacks and defenses are trending at the moment. The details of well-motivated
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attacks or cost-effective defenses change as technology changes, and particular
defenses might cycle in and out of fashion. Instead, to achieve the goal of the
paper, we derive our focus and organization from two perspectives.
The first perspective is that, although mechanisms for network security are
extremely diverse, they are all instances of just a few patterns. By emphasizing
the patterns, we are able to cover more ground. We also aim to help the reader
understand the big issues and retain the most important facts.
The second perspective comes from the observation that security mecha-
nisms interact in important ways, with each other and with other aspects of
networking. Although these interactions are not frequently discussed, they de-
serve our attention. To provide communication services that are secure and also
fully supportive of distributed applications, network designers must understand
the consequences of their decisions on all aspects of network architecture and
services.
The boundaries of network security have been drawn by convention over
time, so §2 begins the tutorial by defining network security in two ways. First,
there is a practical classification of network security attacks, based primarily
on which agents are the attackers, defenders, and potential victims. The clas-
sification is based secondarily on defense mechanisms. Second, we discuss how
network security is related to information security and other forms of cyber-
security, as well as the gaps where no comprehensive defenses yet exist.
The four main sections of the tutorial cover the four major patterns for
providing network security. All agents can protect their own communications
with cryptographic protocols (§4), which (among other benefits) hide the data
contents of packets. Networks can protect both themselves and their users by
traffic filtering (§5). Both users and networks can employ dynamic resource
allocation to overcome attacks (§6). Although cryptographic protocols hide the
data contents of packets, they cannot hide packet headers, because the network
needs them to deliver the packets. So when users need to hide packet headers
from adversaries, which may include the network from which they are receiving
service, they must resort to compound sessions and overlays (§7). The first three
patterns will be familiar to anyone who has even dabbled in network security,
while the importance of the fourth pattern has not been sufficiently recognized.
Between the definition of network security and the four major sections, §3
presents a new descriptive model of networks and network services. This model
explains how network services are provided by means of composition of many
networks at many levels of abstraction, where each network is self-contained in
the sense of having—at least potentially—all the basic mechanisms of network-
ing (such as routing, forwarding, session protocols, and directories). This model
allows complete and precise descriptions of today’s network architectures. It is
also necessary for recognition of the four patterns, because the same patterns are
reused in different networks in a compositional architecture. The patterns are
reusable precisely because the different networks have fundamental similarities,
despite the fact that they may have different purposes, levels of abstraction,
membership scope, or geographical span.
In each of the four main sections, in addition to presenting a security mech-
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anism, we consider how the mechanism interacts with other mechanisms within
its network and across composed networks. This helps to determine where se-
curity could and should be placed in a compositional network architecture.
2 What is network security?
Network security is a pragmatic subject with boundaries that have been drawn
by convention over time. Although the focus of this tutorial is defense mecha-
nisms, we must have some idea of what kind of attacks they can defend against.
Classifying security attacks is extremely difficult because—by their very
nature—security attacks are clever, they exploit gaps in standard models, and
they are always evolving. In §2.1 we present a practical classification scheme
based on multiple factors. It only covers known attacks, and there are some
overlaps in the categories, but it does provide intuition that will be helpful for
understanding the defenses.
Of all the factors relevant to security attacks, the worst factor for purposes
of classification is real-world consequences (or, alternatively, the motivations
of attackers). These consequences include financial loss, loss of time, loss of
privacy, loss of reputation, loss of political freedom, loss of physical safety, and
so on. Often, these losses are intertwined, because one loss causes another.
Some attacks have no direct real-world consequences: their sole purpose is to
enable other, more damaging, attacks.
Our practical classification scheme, summarized in Figure 1, is based primar-
ily on which agents are the attackers, defenders, and potential victims. With
one exception (see table), agents can be either:
• the network, meaning the infrastructure machines provided by the network
operator to run the network,
• safe users, meaning machines that use a network for communication and
whose behavior is satisfactory according to whatever rules or authorities
apply, or
• unsafe users, meaning machines that have access to a network and whose
behavior is unsatisfactory because they have been programmed maliciously,
ignorantly, or erroneously.
Classification is based secondarily on defense mechanisms; these must be sec-
ondary to defenders because some mechanisms are only available to some de-
fenders.
Note that the network is usually a defender, but can be an attacker. Even
though traffic filtering is a possible defense for three attack categories, as we will
explain below, the details of filtering against different attacks are quite different.
In §2.2 we will discuss alternative definitions of security. These include other
kinds of cyber-security that complement network security, attacks for which
comprehensive defenses do not yet exist, and alternative classification schemes.
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ATTACKERS POTENTIAL
VICTIMS
FLOODING
ATTACKS
unsafe users
unsafe users
network and/or
unsafe users
network defends with
trac ltering and/or
dynamic resource
allocation
network defends
with trac ltering and/or
cryptographic protocols
safe users defend
with cryptographic protocols
and/or compound sessions
and overlays
network and/or
safe users
network and/or
safe users
safe users
SUBVERSION
ATTACKS
POLICY
VIOLATIONS
SPYING AND
TAMPERING
unsafe users network defends
with trac ltering
authority responsible
for the policy
DEFENDERS AND
DEFENSE MECHANISMS
safe users defend
with dynamic resource
allocation
safe users defend
with cryptographic
protocols
Figure 1: A practical classification of network security attacks.
2.1 A practical classification of network security attacks
2.1.1 Flooding attacks
In a flooding attack, attackers send floods of packets toward the victim, seek-
ing to make it unavailable by exhausting its resources. Consequently, flooding
attacks are one type of denial-of-service attack (see §2.2.1).
The intended victims of flooding attacks vary. If the victim is a public server
or user machine, the attack might seek to exhaust its compute-cycle, memory,
or bandwidth resources. Note that some public servers such as DNS servers are
part of the infrastructure of a network, so a flooding attack on a DNS server is an
attempt to deny some network services to a large number of users. An attacker
might also target some portion of a network, seeking to exhaust the bandwidth
of its links. A bandwidth attack can make particular users unreachable, and
can also deny network service to many other users whose packets pass through
the congested portion of the network. A bandwidth attack can also shift traffic
to a less-secure part of a network, enabling other security attacks.
If an attacker simply sends as many packets as it can toward a victim, the
resources expended by the attacker may be similar to the resources expended
by the victim! A distributed denial-of-service attack can be launched from many
coordinated machines, focusing the resources of many machines onto a smaller
number of targets. Alternatively, a flooding attack can employ some form of
amplification, in which the attacker’s resources are amplified to cause the victim
to expend far more resources. Here are some well-known forms of amplification:
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• A “botnet” is formed by penetrating large numbers (as in millions) of
innocent-but-buggy machines connected to the Internet, and installing in
them a particular kind of malware. Subsequently the attacker sends a
triggering packet to each member of the botnet, causing it to launch a
security attack unbeknownst to the machine’s owner. This is another
kind of distributed denial-of-service attack.
• An “asymmetric attack” sends requests to a server that require it to ex-
pend significant compute or storage resources for each request, so that a
relatively small amount of traffic is sufficient to launch a significant attack.
A typical IP example is a “SYN flood,” in which the victim receives a flood
of TCP SYN (session initiation) packets. Each packet causes the server to
do significant work and allocate significant resources such as buffer space.
Also in IP networks, attackers can flood DNS servers with queries for
random domain names (a “random subdomain attack”). These will force
the servers to make many more queries, because they will have no cached
results to match them. In a Web-based application network, the attacker
can send particular HTTP requests that force a Web server to do a large
amount of computation.
• An attacker can send many request packets to public servers, with the
intended victim’s name as source name. This “reflection attack” causes
all the servers to send their responses to the victim. It amplifies work
because responses (received by the victim) are typically much longer than
requests (sent by the attacker).
• In an Ethernet network, a forwarder’s response to receiving a packet to an
unknown destination is to “flood” the network with it, which means (in
this case) to send it out all links so that eventually all machines receive
it and the designated destination responds to it. An attacker can amplify
any packet this way, simply by putting in an unused destination name.
Network infrastructure provides the principal defense against flooding at-
tacks, by filtering out attack packets (§5). Flooding attacks can also be coun-
tered by allocating additional resources to handle peak loads (§6); this is some-
thing that both network infrastructure and targeted users can do.
If network infrastructure discovers where attack traffic is coming from, de-
fending against the attack becomes much easier. For this reason, attackers
employ various techniques to hide themselves, for example:
• In an IP network, a sender can simply put a false source name in the
packet header, commonly called “spoofing.” In email applications, source
email addresses are also easily spoofed.
• With a botnet, even if bots use their true source names, there may be
too many of them to cut off. The IP address of the master of the botnet
remains hidden.
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• An attacker can hide by putting a smaller-than-usual number in IP pack-
ets’ time-to-live fields, so that the packets are dropped after they have
done their damage in congesting the network, but before they reach a
place where measurements are collected or defenses are deployed.
Flooding attacks are a very serious problem in today’s Internet. There are
businesses that generate them for small fees. They target popular Web sites
and (especially) DNS [17]. The worst attacks are mounted by enterprises, albeit
illegal ones, that can draw on the same kind of professional knowledge, human
resources, and computer resources that legitimate businesses and governments
have. Such attackers will use many attacks and combinations of attacks at
once, and can continue them over a long period of time. According to industry
reports, we are entering the era of flooding attacks of terabits per second [3].
2.1.2 Subversion attacks
The purpose of a subversion attack on a network member is to get the victim’s
machine to act as the attacker wants it to, rather than as the owner of the
machine wants. Here are some well-known examples of subversion attacks:
• The attacker sends malware to infect or penetrate the machine. The
malware might be spyware or ransomware, capable of stealing or damaging
data stored in the machine. The malware might turn the machine into a
bot, so the botnet master can exploit the machine’s resources. Or it might
attack the physical world through devices controlled by the machine.
• Port scanning is the process of trying TCP and UDP destination ports on
a range of IP addresses, to find pairs that will accept a session initiation.
Port scanning does not in itself do much harm, but it is gathering informa-
tion to be used in launching other malware attacks. This is because most
malware targets a known vulnerability in a specific application program.
Scanning is less productive in IPv6, because the address space is much
larger, but specially focused scans may still succeed.
• The Border Gateway Protocol (BGP) is a control protocol through which
IP networks exchange routing information. In “BGP hijacking,” an at-
tacker uses BGP to insert false information, telling routers to send packets
with certain destination names to the attacker rather than the true des-
tination. The attacker may simply drop the redirected packets, denying
service to the victim. The attacker can also respond to the packets as
an impersonation of the intended destination, for the purpose of stealing
commerce or secrets.
• Subversion attacks on directories also insert false information. Higher-
level names will then be mapped to the wrong lower-level names, with
the same consequences as route hijacking. The directory protocol DNS
(World-Wide Web name to IP address) and the IPv4 directory protocol
ARP (IP address to Ethernet address) are subject to subversion attacks,
as is the IPv6 replacement for ARP, called Neighbor Discovery.
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• Email spam and voice-over-IP robocalls can be considered subversion at-
tacks. A networked device’s owner wants the device for communicating
with acquaintances and chosen institutions. These attacks force the device
to present ads and other unsolicited junk to the attention of its owner.
If a receiver of information knows the correct source of that information, then
both users and network components can protect themselves from subversion by
using cryptographic protocols. With cryptographic authentication, they know
the identity of the agent with which they are communicating.
In other cases, network infrastructure protects itself and its users from sub-
version attacks by traffic filtering. But filtering for subversion attacks is signif-
icantly different from filtering for flooding attacks because subversion requires
two-way communication between attacker and victim. For example, if the vic-
tim is a server that communicates using TCP, the attacker cannot send data to
it until the initial TCP handshake is completed. This means that an attacker
cannot hide by spoofing: if an attacker puts a false source name in its first
packet to the victim, it will never receive a reply to its SYN, and can never
complete the handshake.
2.1.3 Policy violations
Obviously, the default behavior of a network is to provide all communication
services requested of it. These services should be provided according to explicit
or implicit agreements about quality and privacy.
On the other hand, the administrative authority of the network, or other
authorities such as governments, employers, and parents, may have policies con-
straining network communication. Specific communications that violate these
policies are security attacks, and the network defends against these attacks by
tampering with the communications (up to and including blocking them) or
by spying on them so that other enforcement actions become possible. These
defenses are exceptions to the default behavior of the network. Examples of
policy violations include:
• Two users can communicate for the purpose of committing a crime. This
should be prevented, or in some cases recorded for evidence in legal pro-
ceedings (“lawful intercept”). Similarly, the communications of suspected
individuals can be monitored for surveillance and investigation.
• Saboteurs can attempt to access the control system of a power grid.
• A minor can attempt to access a Web site that violates parental controls.
• A network may consider certain voice or video applications to take up
more bandwidth than individual users are entitled to, and rate-limit them
to minimize their effects on overall performance.
• Operators of enterprise networks know which employees are using which
machines for which purposes. Often they configure their networks to
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prevent unnecessary communications, which may be attacks, and can be
blocked without harm even if they are only mistakes. For example, ma-
chines used by engineers should not have access to the enterprise’s per-
sonnel database.
Network infrastructure defends against policy violations by traffic filtering.
As indicated above, violating packets can simply be discarded, but they can
also be recorded, tampered with, or rate-limited.
Traffic filtering for policy enforcement is different from traffic filtering against
flooding and subversion attacks because the filtering is so specific. There is
often a specified target whose communications are being monitored. Flooding
and subversion attacks, in contrast, usually have unknown sources, and their
victims are often opportunistic.
2.1.4 Spying and tampering
The victims of spying and tampering are network users, who want their commu-
nications to be private, and want the network to be a transparent and effective
medium of communication. The attackers in spying and tampering can be un-
safe users, or they can also be the infrastructure machines of the network itself.
Note that tampering is different from subversion because, in subversion, one
endpoint of the communication is the attacker. In a tampering attack, the com-
munication has two innocent endpoints, and the attacker is causing what one
endpoint receives to differ from what the other endpoint sent.
When the attacker is the network, a spying or tampering attack is the exact
dual of a policy violation—both the users and the network are doing exactly
the same thing, and the only difference is which party we consider good or
bad. Judgments of which behaviors are good or bad emerge from social debates
involving legal, commercial, political, and ethical considerations. These debates
should not be constrained by technology. Rather, the goal of technical experts
should be to have the knowledge to implement whatever decisions emerge from
these debates [15].
Examples of spying and tampering include:
• Some governments censor the Internet usage of their citizens. Even if
networks in their countries are privately owned, the governments can insist
that network providers enforce their policies.
• Some governments use surveillance of network usage as a tool in repression
of or retaliation against political dissidents.
• By observing the searches and Web accesses of a network user, an attacker
can learn a great deal about the user’s personal life.
• Network infrastructure can insert into the paths of user sessions middle-
boxes that insert ads or alter search results.
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The “Great Cannon” is an example of a tampering attack that does no
direct harm (to the endpoints of a targeted communication), but instead enables
another attack. The attacker is a network, as the Great Cannon appears to
share many resources with the Great Firewall of China. The Cannon replaces
ads being fetched from Chinese servers (by machines outside China) with scripts
that cause the recipients to access the servers of designated victims. At high
volumes, this results in a distributed denial-of-service attack on the victims [39].
Network users have two possible defenses against spying and tampering.
The first is the use of cryptographic protocols (§4), which conceal the data in
transmitted packets. The second is the use of compound sessions and overlays
(§7), which seek to hide packets so that even their headers, sizes, and timing
cannot be observed.
2.2 Relation to other definitions of security
2.2.1 The information-security triad
Governments, enterprises, and other institutions have broad concerns about in-
formation security. These concerns are articulated by the well-known “information-
security (CIA) triad,” consisting of the properties of confidentiality (secrecy,
privacy, access control), integrity (the information is valid or uncorrupted or
has correct provenance information), and availability (information can be read
or written whenever needed).
These broad concerns about privacy include insider attacks and theft of phys-
ical storage media. The broad concerns about integrity and availability include
natural disasters and even military attacks that might affect data centers. If
the opposite of availability is denial-of-service, we can see that denial-of-service
attack is also an extremely broad category.
Although the goals of the CIA triad have a great deal of overlap with the
goals of network security, the classification scheme of §2.1 is far more focused.
It is confined to threats incurred by operating a network or being connected to
one, and it is closely tied to specific defense mechanisms within networks.
2.2.2 Complementary forms of security
For network users, network security is a first line of defense against subversion
attacks; a major goal is to keep subversion packets from being delivered to user
machines. If the packets do arrive, then security measures in operating systems
and applications must take over. Many applications and most operating systems
now have well-developed security measures of their own. However, old operating
systems, real-time operating systems, and Internet of Things devices (which are
highly resource-constrained) tend to have far fewer security mechanisms built
in. For these endpoints, network defenses against subversion remain important.
Another subfield of security research and practice concerns “trust manage-
ment,” which is technology aimed at deciding which agents should have permis-
sion to access which resources or perform which operations, based on the cre-
dentials and attributes of the agent, and on the permission policies applicable to
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the object (see, for example, [21, 35]). Trust management is a decision-making
component of most forms of security, including network security. Distributed
trust-management systems also rely on network security, for instance to com-
municate secret information safely among nodes of the system.
Most security experts would probably agree that the human side of security
is the most important and the hardest to deal with. In an ideal world, all
institutions would have sophisticated cyber-security policies, and enforce them.
These policies would prevent (among other problems) insider attacks in which
employees with access to code deliberately put bugs or backdoors in it. All
people using computers would keep their software updated, choose hard-to-guess
passwords, and change default passwords immediately. (Botnets are heavily
populated with Internet of Things devices such as baby monitors, because they
come with factory-installed passwords, and their naive owners do not change
them.) No one would be fooled by “phishing” attacks, which imitate a legitimate
email so that the recipient clicks on a malicious hyperlink embedded in it. And
on and on.
2.2.3 Threats with inadequate defenses
Personal data privacy is a form of security that is much discussed in today’s
world. Individuals are concerned about the massive amounts of personal data
that is collected about them by Web sites, search engines, and other applications.
This data is extremely valuable for selling advertising, and can also be used for
worse purposes. Individual users can protect their privacy to some extent by
using anti-spying defenses to achieve anonymity. Anonymously, they can email
and participate in social media. At some point, however, full participation in
electronic commerce and institutional services almost forces people to disclose
their identities [54].
Finally, there is the growing threat of side-channel attacks. Network infras-
tructure monitors traffic to filter out flooding attacks, subversion attacks, and
policy violations. Attackers also observe and analyze network traffic, for the
purpose of spying and tampering. What are the characteristics of network traf-
fic to be observed and analyzed, in addition to principal header fields and packet
contents (which are explicitly intended and known to carry information)?
The timing and sizes of packets can be observed. Pseudo-random header
fields, intended merely to group or distinguish packets, might be carrying secret
codes. Optional header fields might reveal the configuration of the machine or
software version that produced it. If the observer has access to the machine
that sent the packet, it might be able to observe processor timing, power con-
sumption, or usage of shared resources as the packet is prepared. Such access
is possible if the machine is a stolen mobile device, or if multiple tenants share
a physical machine in a cloud.
All of these characteristics are usually incidental, but they can be controlled
by the sender to signal information to a knowledgeable observer that is invisible
to other observers. This is known as a “covert channel.” Incidental characteris-
tics can also be analyzed by an adversarial observer, to gain information despite
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the intentions of the sender. This is known as “side-channel” information [53].
Extracting side-channel information from packet timing and sizes is becoming
more common, both for (good) filtering and (bad) spying, because the expand-
ing use of cryptography has hidden much explicit information [42]. At present
defenses against side-channel spying are patchy and experimental.
3 A model of networking
To find the patterns underlying network security mechanisms, and to understand
how these patterns interact with each other and with other aspects of network
architecture, we must be able to describe today’s networks in a way that is
somewhat abstract and yet very precise. The “classic” Internet architecture
[13] and the OSI reference model [27] have not kept up with the Internet’s
evolution since the early 1990s. For a better way to describe networks, we will
use the compositional model of networking introduced in [58].
In this section we give a brief overview of the compositional model, covering
the structures and aspects that will be used in the rest of the tutorial. Although
the model uses familiar terms, be aware that when they have definitions within
the model, it is these precise and specific definitions that apply.
3.1 Components of a network
The components of a network are members and links. A member of a network
is a software and/or hardware module running on a computing machine, and
participating in the network. As a participant, the member implements some
subset of the network’s protocols. A network member usually has a unique name
in the namespace of the network. For example, Figure 2 shows five members of
a network with unique names A, B, etc.
send (packet)
deliver (packet)
receive (packet)
A
B
C
D
E
machine
module of
distributed
system
machine
module of
distributed
system
NETWORK
members point-to-point links
Figure 2: Components of a single network, and its user interface.
In the compositional model a network always has a single administrative
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authority, or alternatively network operator, which is a person or organization
responsible for the network. The operator provides and administers resources
for the network, in the form of links, members, and additional resources on the
members’ machines. The operator is expected to protect the network’s resources
and ensure that users of the network enjoy the promised communication ser-
vices. It is convenient to partition the members of a network into infrastructure
members administered by the operator to provide services, and user members
belonging to the network for the purpose of employing its services.1
A network member can send or receive digital units called packets on one or
more links of the network. A link is a communication channel. Most physical
links are wires, optical fibers, or radio frequencies. Wires and optical fibers are
usually used as point-to-point links, with two endpoints and transmission in one
or both directions. Radio frequencies are broadcast links, on which any member
with suitable hardware and within radio range can send or receive. In wired
networks, buses (used in older Ethernets and cable networks) are also broadcast
links, so packets can be sent and received by any machine connected to them.
Broadcast links are mostly ignored in this tutorial. The reason is that most
links are virtual rather than physical (see §3.3), and the layering mechanism
that creates virtual links is usually applied to make broadcast physical links
appear as point-to-point virtual links in higher layers of a network architecture.
A public network allows any machine to host a network member and connect
to the network, while a private network allows only authorized members. One
of the two common authorization mechanisms is cryptographic protocols (§4).
The other authorization mechanism is physical security, in which intruders are
denied physical access to the links of the network.
3.2 Functions of a network
As shown in Figure 2, a network enables modules of a distributed system on
different machines to communicate. We say that a network provides one or more
communication services. A particular instance or usage of a communication
service is called a session. Like a link, a session is also a communication channel
for digital packets. The minimum semantics of a session is that it is a group of
packets that the users of the service regard as belonging together.
Communication services can be specified to have a wide variety of proper-
ties, which the network operator is obligated to enforce. There are two major
mechanisms in networks for satisfying service specifications. The first is rout-
ing and forwarding. Forwarding is the mechanism that extends the reach of
the network beyond individual links to paths of links; in forwarding, a member
receives a packet on an incoming link, and sends it out on an outgoing link to
get it closer to its destination. A forwarder is an infrastructure member whose
primary purpose is forwarding. Figure 3 shows a path through an IP network
between user members A on Alice’s machine and B on Bob’s machine. In the
1In the case of peer-to-peer networks, each member contributes only its own resources, and
there may be no central operator or administrator. For these networks, the authority is the
cooperative agreement among members.
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figure, R1 and R2 are “IP routers,” i.e., forwarders. All these names are “IP
addresses.”
local-
area
networks path of
links and members
session session session
link linklink
IP
network
a b
TCP session
Alice’s
machine
Bob’s
machine
A R1
r1 r1 r2 r2
R2 B
infrastructure
machine
infrastructure
machine
Figure 3: The IP networks of the Internet are layered on many local-area networks.
Routing is the control mechanism that controls forwarding by populating for-
warding tables in forwarders. Forwarders consult their tables to know where to
forward packets. Routing and forwarding can be extended beyond minimum re-
quirements of reachability to perform services such as broadcasting and steering
packets through middleboxes—members that perform various packet-processing
functions related to security, efficiency, or interoperability.
Routing and forwarding work together by means of a network’s forwarding
protocol, which is a set of rules governing the format of packets transmitted
through the network. Each packet has a header part and a payload or data part.
A header usually includes a source name indicating which member originally
sent the packet, and a destination name indicating which member is intended
to ultimately receive the packet. Entries in a forwarding table match fields in a
packet header.
The other major mechanism for satisfying service specifications is session
protocols. A session protocol is a set of rules governing packet formats, higher-
level semantic units, and participant behavior during a session. In Figure 3,
the session shown in the IP network uses the TCP session protocol. Following
the rules of TCP, the session endpoints maintain state and send extra packets
to provide reliable, ordered data delivery despite the facts that IP links are not
perfectly reliable, and different packets of a session may be routed on different
paths. UDP (another IP session protocol) is much simpler and implements fewer
services, but it does define port numbers that can be used to group related
packets.
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3.3 Composition of networks
We have defined networks as self-contained modules with members, links, rout-
ing, forwarding, and session protocols. In today’s Internet, there are many
networks, each of which may be specialized according to its purpose, member-
ship scope, geographical span, and level of abstraction. A network architecture
is a flexible composition of these networks, and thus called a “compositional
network architecture” [58].
There are two composition operators on networks, the first being layering.
The model defines layering precisely: one network is layered on another network
if a link in the overlay network is implemented by a session in the underlay net-
work. For example, each IP link in Figure 3 is implemented by a session in a
local-area network, as indicated by the bold arrows. Members of different net-
works on the same machine communicate through the operating system and/or
hardware of the machine. IP packets sent on an IP link are actually encapsu-
lated in Ethernet headers and transported through local-area networks as the
data parts of Ethernet packets. Since the implementation of an overlay link
always consists of digital logic, whether in hardware or software, an overlay link
is always virtual, regardless of whether the links in the underlay are physical
or virtual. Note that the IP network in Figure 3 plays the same role as the
distributed system in Figure 2.
As Figure 3 shows, almost all networked machines host members of at least
two networks, and some host many more. We use the term member rather than
node because the latter is too similar in connotation to machine. The figure
shows how layering extends the reach of the local-area networks, each of which
is isolated. A local-area network only implements an IP link, but the IP network
can reach machines over paths that are concatenations of links.
The second composition operator on networks is bridging. Bridging sim-
ply means that two particular networks share some links, so they can forward
packets to each other. If the designs of bridged networks are sufficiently ho-
mogeneous, in particular if they share session protocols, then sessions can cross
network boundaries. In the Internet, many IP networks are bridged together in
this way. These networks differ in their operators/administrative authorities,
but not their basic design.
The definition of layering in compositional network architecture is very differ-
ent from the older notion of layering in networks found in the “classic” Internet
architecture [13] and OSI reference model [27]. In the new model, each layer is
a complete network, so IP routing/forwarding and IP session protocols belong
to the same network/layer. In the new model, an architecture has as many
layers as needed, which often includes multiple IP networks layered on top of
one another. We use the compositional model in this tutorial because it allows
comprehensive yet precise descriptions of how the Internet actually works today
[58]. It is also necessary for recognition of the four patterns, because the same
patterns are reused in different networks in a compositional architecture. And
layering of networks over networks and bridged sets of networks is especially im-
portant because it makes it possible to reason rigorously about networks from
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the bottom up: properties proved of an implementing session are automatically
true of the implemented link.
3.4 Other forms of composition
Network composition is the most important form of composition in network
architecture. Nevertheless, two other forms of composition, both found inside
individual networks, are relevant to security.
3.4.1 Protocol composition
Control packets are used by a protocol to synchronize the endpoints and share
specific parameters. Data packets contain the substance being communicated.
Although a session protocol may have only one of these packet types, many
protocols have both, or mix control information and data in a single packet.
Within a network, session protocols can be composed, so that the same
session benefits from the services implemented by multiple protocols. When
two session protocols P and Q are composed, one of them is embedded in the
other. If P is embedded in Q, for instance, most packets in the session will have
the format shown in Figure 4, in which the P header and data are encapsulated
in Q data (the figure also shows optional footers, which are required by some
protocols). In addition, the session may include control packets of Q that are
independent of P and have no encapsulated P packets.
network
header
Q header Q footerP header P footerP data
contains destination
name, session
identier,
next-protocol Q
contains Q-specic
information,
next-protocol P
Q data
Figure 4: Packets of a network with session protocol P embedded in session protocol
Q. The shaded part is all specific to P . Protocol footers are optional.
The figure shows an ideal packet format in which the network header of a
packet includes the destination name and session identifier for the entire session,
so that all packets of the session will be easily identifiable to the forwarders.
Each network or protocol header names the type of the next header, if any, so
that session protocols can be composed freely. Unfortunately, not all packet
formats are so cleanly designed.
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3.4.2 Compound sessions
A user member initiating a session to some far endpoint can insert another user
member into the session path as a middlebox. To do this, the initiating user must
give the name of the middlebox as the destination name of its outgoing packets,
as shown in Figure 5. The middlebox must learn the initiator’s intended far
endpoint, for example by getting it from some other field of the session-initiation
packet. Then the middlebox changes the headers of the packets it receives
(source becomes its own name, destination becomes the initiator’s intended)
and sends them out. A middlebox that behaves in this way is called a proxy.
Each proxy accepts a session, initiates another session with a different header,
remembers the association between the two sessions, and relays packets between
them. A compound session is a chain of simple sessions composed by proxies in
this way.
initiator proxy acceptor
A CB
src = B, dst = Csrc = A, dst = B
Figure 5: A compound session with two simple sessions.
A compound session can have more than one proxy (as an example of how to
do this, the session-initiation packet can contain a list of proxies to visit, ending
with the final destination). Because of the names in forward packet headers,
return packets naturally pass through the same proxies in reverse order, and
have their headers re-translated in reverse order.
The principal security significance of compound sessions is that each simple
session has a different header, so compound sessions can be employed by users
to obscure header information (making them complementary to cryptography).
In Figure 5, an observer between A and B cannot observe the true acceptor
of the compound session, at least from packet headers alone, and an observer
between B and C cannot observe the true initiator of the compound session.
4 Cryptographic protocols
Cryptographic protocols are incorporated into the session protocols of a network.
Cryptographic protocols are executed by the endpoints of a point-to-point ses-
sion, so that the session will have (data) integrity and (data) confidentiality.
These are the same terms used in the information-security triad, but in this
context they have a much more specific meaning. Confidentiality means that no
party except a designated receiver can read the packets sent. Integrity means
that no third party can insert, modify, or replay packets of the session, so that
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the packets received by a designated receiver are the exact packets sent by the
designated sender, and if the sender sends a distinguished packet m times, the
receiver receives it at most m times.
Cryptographic protocols can also achieve endpoint authentication, which
means that either session endpoint can be sure of the other endpoint’s iden-
tity. Confidentiality should be reinforced by the property of forward secrecy,
which means that even if an encrypted session is recorded by an attacker, and
the attacker learns the secrets of one of its endpoints at some later time, the
attacker still cannot decrypt and read the recorded packets.
User members of a network use cryptographic protocols to protect themselves
against spying and tampering attacks. Infrastructure members, also, defend
network operations against spying and tampering with cryptographic protocols.
It is important that cryptographic protocols are designed for the most hostile
environments. For example, in accepted proof systems (such as [10, 40]), the
baseline model of a security protocol allows an adversary to control all commu-
nication channels between the endpoints (and other agents they might query),
examining, storing, deleting, injecting, or altering any packets that the adver-
sary wishes. Because cryptographic protocols are designed (and proved mathe-
matically) with such conservative assumptions, users trust them even when they
can trust nothing about the layers of networking between endpoints.
§4.1 begins our discussion of cryptographic protocols by introducing the
central concept of identity. The foundation for all cryptographic protocols is
public-key cryptography (§4.2), because it provides some crucial functions and
supports others. In §4.3 we return to the properties of data integrity and con-
fidentiality. Finally, in §4.4 we discuss architectural interactions with crypto-
graphic protocols that are relatively independent of other security patterns.
In §4.1 through §4.3 the context will be a single network of any kind. The
discussion also covers a set of similar bridged networks all at the same level of
the layering hierarchy, for example the bridged IP networks of the Internet. §4.4
broadens the context, as it includes how cryptographic protocols interact with
composition of networks by layering.
4.1 Trust and identity
Security requirements are based on which network members do and do not
“trust” each other. Of course a network member is a software or hardware
module; it cannot trust in any ordinary sense of the word, and has no legal
responsibility that it can be trusted to fulfill. For the purpose of establishing
trust, a network member that is an endpoint of a session has an identity. This
identity is given to the other endpoint of the session in answer to the question,
“With whom am I communicating?”
This role implies that an identity should have meaning in the world outside
the network. Often it is closely associated with a legal person—a person or
organization—who is legally responsible for the network member. The identity
is usually the source of the data that the network member sends during the
session.
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Identities are related to layering, because layering allows a machine to have
different names—one in the namespace of each network it participates in—at the
same time. For example, in Figure 6, each machine is participating in a higher-
level Web-based application network and a lower-level IP network bridged with
other IP networks. The dynamic sessions and links in the figure are formed as
follows. The client’s browser at the upper level instructs its IP member C to
contact bigbank.com. When there is layering of networks, a directory is often
used to find where an overlay member is attached to an underlay network. C
looks up bigbank.com in the DNS directory, and finds it is located on the same
machine as IP member S. At the lower level, C initiates a TCP session to S.
When the TCP session (and dynamic link) are ready, the browser initiates a
request/response HTTP session over it.
[browser] bigbank.
com
Jane Q. Public
Web-based
application
 network
C S
client’s IP
network
transit IP
 networks
server’s IP
 network
TCP session
dynamic link
HTTP session
client’s
machine
server’s
machine
implementation
Figure 6: Member names and identities in a Web application.
If the two endpoints of the TCP session need to authenticate each other (as
they should, for a banking transaction), what identities do they give as their
own? The general answer is that each gives its member name or the name of a
higher-level network member that is using it. Either IP interface could give its
IP name, but it would not be a very good identifier—too transient, or with too
little meaning in the outside world. Instead, the server’s IP interface S will be
known by its public Web name bigbank.com. The client’s machine does not have
a name in the application network, because the browser only initiates sessions
and never accepts them. However, the user of the browser is a person named
Jane Q. Public, whose clicks and keystrokes provide input to the browser. The
browser will send Jane Q. Public as its identity, and we can imagine this identity
as a member of an even-higher-level distributed financial system.
For endpoint authentication, a member must have access to a secret asso-
ciated with the identity it provides. One kind of secret, useful when the two
endpoints have an ongoing relationship, is a password. The server bigbank.com
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knows Jane’s password, and she can type it into the browser when requested.
For the important cryptographic protocols, however, the secret is always
a public/private cryptographic key pair (see next section). The relationships
among the important entities are shown in Figure 7. The identity is responsible
for the packets sent by the network member, and the network member has access
to the public key and its paired private key.
has access to
(checked by endpoint
authentication)
is the
user of this
session
endpoint
owns
(certied by
certicate authority)
public/private
key pairidentity
network member,
session endpoint
Figure 7: Relationships among identification entities.
A “certificate authority” is trusted to ascertain that a particular public key
belongs to a particular identity; it issues a certificate to that effect and signs it
digitally. Thus when an endpoint receives a certificate, it can trust the identity
that goes with the key (at least, as well as it trusts the certificate authority). As
indicated above, identities found in certificates include names of legal persons,
domain names, and IP addresses.
It should be noted that trust between communicating endpoints is not nec-
essarily simple or absolute. For instance, two endpoints may be communicating
to negotiate a contract, and (because they do not trust each other completely)
need to communicate through a third party trusted by both. A trusted broker
can ensure, for example, that both parties sign the exact same contract [9].
4.2 Public-key cryptography and its uses
In public-key cryptography, an identity generates and owns a coordinated pair
of keys, one public and one kept private and secret. The important proper-
ties of these keys are that (i) it is extremely difficult to compute the private
key from the public key, and (ii) plaintext encrypted with the public key can
be decrypted with the private key, and vice-versa. Today’s public-key cryp-
tography is descended from the Diffie-Hellman Key Exchange protocol and the
RSA algorithm (named for its inventors Ron Rivest, Adi Shamir, and Leonard
Adleman).
At present a key must be at least 2048 bits to be considered secure (the
minimum size is expected to increase in the future). A public key is a pair of
unsigned integers (n, e). The corresponding private key is a pair (n, d). To be
encrypted, a packet must be divided into chunks such that each chunk has an
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integer representation less than n. If m is such a chunk, then the public-key
encryption of m is me mod n, and the private-key encryption of m is md mod n.
The point of this isolated detail is to show why public-key cryptography is com-
putationally expensive (think of what big numbers the exponents are!), which
is an important factor in design of cryptographic protocols.
4.2.1 Endpoint authentication
A simple challenge protocol is sufficient to determine that an endpoint has access
to a public/private key pair. Suppose that an endpoint B is engaged in a session
with endpoint A, and wants to check its identity’s claim to own public key K+.
B can make sure of this by sending a nonce (a random number used only once in
its context) n. A is supposed to reply with K−(n), which is n encrypted using
the private key K− that goes with public key K+. B then decrypts the reply
with K+. If the result is n, then B has authenticated that the other endpoint
indeed has access to public key K+ and its private key K−.
In practice B may not know the public key ahead of time. In a typical
client/server protocol, the client needs to authenticate the server, but the server
does not authenticate the client. The client B might send its nonce to A, and
A might reply with both its certificate and K−(n). From the certificate, B gets
K+. The client should validate the certificate as well as the encrypted nonce,
including checking that the identity in the certificate is the identity expected,
checking that the certificate has not expired, and checking that it has been signed
by a legitimate certificate authority. Some client software validates certificates
poorly or not al all, causing it to be dubbed “the most dangerous code in the
world” [19].
A server can delegate its identity to another trusted network member, by
giving the delegate its certificate and keys. For example, “content-delivery net-
works” host Web content on behalf of other enterprises. Content-delivery servers
are trusted delegates of their customers, and each such server can have many
delegated identities.
As mentioned in §4.1, IP names (addresses) are not very good identities,
because they are often assigned transiently, and are never mnemonic. As a
result, the names of IP members cannot be authenticated, leading directly to
the prominence of spoofing in a variety of security attacks. The Accountable
Internet [2] is a proposal based on the alternative principle that Internet names
should be the persistent identities of Internet members, and that they should
be “self-certifying.” This means that any other member communicating with a
member can authenticate its name, even without trusting a certificate authority.
This is important in a global network, because there are no certificate authorities
that are trusted by all countries [14].
Clearly this could be achieved if the name of a member were its public key,
but public keys are too long for network names. The Accountable Internet
solves this problem by using as a member’s name a 144-bit cryptographic hash
of its public key. A cryptographic hash is computed by a function H from a
digital message m (of any length) to a fixed-length bit string. Its important
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property is that, given a hash H(m), it is extremely difficult to compute a
different message m′ such that H(m) = H(m′). In AIP, having validated that a
member has public key K+, a validator completes the job by computing H(K+)
and checking that it is the same as the member’s name.
In the Accountable Internet Protocol (AIP), endpoint authentication is not
implemented in user endpoints by session protocols, as is usual; rather it is part
of routing and forwarding, and is implemented in AIP forwarders. The costs
are considerable and everyone connected to the Internet must bear them, which
is why AIP is a radical proposal. The Accountable Internet’s counter-argument
would be that endpoint authentication is essential for network security, so ev-
eryone needs it all the time.
4.2.2 Digital signatures
A digital signature transmitted with a document can be checked to verify that
the document came from a specific identity, and has not been modified in transit.
The simplest digital signature of a document m would be K−(m), i.e., the
document itself encrypted with the private key of the signer. The recipient
decrypts the signature with the public key of the signer. If the result is m, then
the signature and document are verified.
Because public-key encryption is computationally expensive, encrypting whole
documents would be very inefficient. In practice a (short) cryptographic hash
H(m) of the document is encrypted with the private key and used as a digital
signature. To verify the signature, the recipient both decrypts the signature
with the public key, and computes the same hash function on the plaintext
document. Verification is successful if both computed values are the same.
If a client is interested in the identity of a server only to obtain its authen-
tic data, then receiving data signed by the server is just as good as receiving
data directly from the server. This kind of delegation is used in Named Data
Networking [59].
4.2.3 Key exchange
Because public-key cryptography is computationally expensive, it is used only
to encrypt small amounts of data. For encrypting the entire data stream being
transmitted on a link, symmetric-key cryptography, which is much more efficient,
is used. As the name implies, symmetric-key cryptography requires that both
endpoints have the same secret key, which is used to both encrypt and decrypt
the data.
This raises the problem of “key exchange,” or how to distribute secret keys
securely over insecure channels. The basic solution to the problem of key ex-
change is the Diffie-Hellman algorithm, shown in Figure 8.
Unfortunately, the basic algorithm is vulnerable to a “man-in-the-middle”
attack, which refers to any attack carried out by an adversary able to intercept
packets on a link. The adversary can read, absorb, inject, or alter any packet
transmitted on the link; the attacker can also “replay” packets by storing them
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g, p, Y(A)
ENDPOINT A ENDPOINT B
  
choose g, p,
random secret X(A);
compute Y(A) = g        mod p
compute Y(B)        mod p
X(A)
X(A)
compute Y(A)        mod p
X(B)
X(B)
X(B)
X(A)
choose random secret X(B);
compute Y(B) = g        mod pY(B)
both are g                mod p
which is the shared secret
Figure 8: Diffie-Hellman key exchange. g is a small number such as 2 or 3, while p,
X(A), and X(B) are large integers.
and retransmitting them later. Figure 9 shows how such an attack would work.
The adversary simply engages in a separate key exchange with each of the two
endpoints. After the key exchange the adversary can relay packets transparently
between A and B by decrypting with one key and encrypting with the other; it
can also read the packets and manipulate them in any way whatsoever.
g, p, Y(A)
g, p, Y(C2)
ENDPOINT A ATTACKER C ENDPOINT B
choose g, p,
random secret X(A);
compute Y(A) = g        mod p
compute Y(C1)        mod p
X(A)
compute Y(A)          mod p
X(C1)
compute Y(B)          mod p
X(C2) compute Y(C2)        mod p
X(B)
X(B)
X(A)
choose random secret X(B);
compute Y(B) = g        mod p
Y(B)
Y(C1)
choose random 
secrets X(C1), X(C2)
and do similar computations
equal
equal
Figure 9: A man-in-the-middle attack on Diffie-Hellman key exchange.
Fortunately, the solution to this problem is straightforward. A and B must
have identities and public/private key pairs, and must authenticate each other
before the key exchange. Then protocol packets must bear the sender’s digital
signature. Even if the attacker can read Y (A) and Y (B), it can do nothing with
them.
4.3 Three IP cryptographic protocols
This section provides an overview of security in the three most important cryp-
tographic protocols in the IP suite:
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• Transport Layer Security (TLS) is the successor to Secure Sockets Layer,
and is an extension of TCP. Two versions of TLS, 1.2 and 1.3, are in
widespread use.
• Quic [34] is a new protocol proposed as an alternative to TLS. Its security
mechanisms are similar to TLS 1.3.
• “IPsec” refers to a family of related IP protocols, comprising the Authenti-
cation Header and Encapsulating Security Payload (ESP) protocols, each
of which can be used in “transport mode” or “tunnel mode.” ESP is more
useful than Authentication Header, so only ESP will be discussed here.
These protocols provide endpoint authentication, data integrity, data confiden-
tiality, and forward secrecy. They have interesting differences, and the differ-
ences are significant for their use in compositional network architectures.
4.3.1 Protocol embeddings
TLS is composed with (embedded in) TCP (recall §3.4.1). If the Uniform Re-
source Locator (URL) of a Web site begins with https://, then its clients
should make requests of it using IP protocol TCP and destination port 443,
signifying the use of TLS embedded in TCP. Figure 10 shows packet formats
for TLS, ESP in transport mode, and ESP in tunnel mode.
ESP PACKET, TUNNEL MODE
TLS PACKET
ESP PACKET, TRANSPORT MODE
IP
header
TCP
header
TLS
header data MAC
IP
header
ESP
header
TCP
header data MAC
IP
header
(lower)
IP
header
(upper)
ESP
header
TCP
header data MAC
Figure 10: Packet formats for cryptographic protocols, slightly simplified. The Mes-
sage Authentication Code (MAC) is a footer that assists in message authentication.
Pink parts of a packet are encrypted, while gray parts are authenticated.
When ESP is used in composition with TCP in transport mode, TCP is
simply embedded in ESP. In contrast, ESP in composition with TCP in tunnel
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mode is an instance of layering (recall §3.3). An entire overlay packet with
IP/TCP headers and data is encapsulated in the data part of an underlay
IP/ESP packet. So the important distinction between ESP transport mode
(session-protocol composition with TCP) and ESP tunnel mode (layering com-
position with TCP) is that in tunnel mode there is an upper IP header with
a completely different destination than in the lower IP header. Intuitively, the
upper destination is the ultimate destination of the TCP session, while the lower
destination is the next hop in the session path (see §4.4.1).
Quic is embedded in UDP, and also uses destination port 443. When a client
accesses an https:// Web site for the first time, it should use TLS. If responses
carry an “I support Quic” code, subsequent requests from that client to that
server should use Quic, with TLS as a fallback in case of problems.
4.3.2 The setup phase
In a TLS 1.2 session, the client and server first have a TCP (control) hand-
shake, in which they establish the session identifier and other parameters. They
then begin a TLS 1.2 (control) handshake, which performs three tasks: (i) end-
point authentication (§4.2.1), (ii) negotiation of a “cipher suite,” and (iii) key
exchange (§4.2.3). Usually the accepting endpoint is authenticated with a cer-
tificate and the initiating endpoint is not, because the acceptor is a server and
the initiator is a client.
TLS supports many different methods for exchanging keys, encrypting data,
and authenticating message integrity (see below). For each of these tasks there
are many possible algorithms (counting all variations of a few basic algorithms).
A “cipher suite” is a collection of algorithms and parameter choices for doing
all the cryptographic tasks within a security protocol. The most important
parameter choices govern key length, because key length has a big effect on the
overall security of cryptography. To negotiate a cipher suite, the initiator sends
all the cipher suites it implements, and the acceptor chooses one that it also
implements and sends back the choice.
The TLS 1.2 handshake adds two round-trip times for TLS setup on top of
the one round-trip for TCP setup. Slightly simplified, there is one round-trip
for authentication and negotiation, and one for key exchange. The property of
forward secrecy is achieved because fresh symmetric keys are computed for each
session.
Security in TLS 1.3 is very similar to the security in Quic. One difference
between TLS 1.2 and Quic (or TLS 1.3) is that Quic disallows some older
cipher suites that are known to be insecure, and requires longer keys. Another
difference is that Quic/TLS 1.3 setups are faster than TLS 1.2 setups.
For faster setups, Quic combines the initial transport handshake with the
initial security handshake. After this there is one additional round-trip for key
exchange. Further, the key-exchange round-trip can be combined with the first
data round-trip, because the client’s first data request is allowed to use a less-
secure symmetric key; the server’s first response and all subsequent data packets
are encrypted with the final, secure symmetric keys. Even further, this one-
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round-trip setup can be eliminated entirely if the client has saved authentication
and negotiation information from previous contact with the server. In this “zero
round-trip” setup, the first round trip combines data and key exchange as above.
ESP endpoints authenticate each other if required, negotiate cipher suites,
and exchange keys by means of the Internet Key Exchange (IKE) protocol. The
result is that each ESP endpoint has long records called “security associations”
including choices of cipher suite and actual keys. Use of full IKE to set up
an ESP session is not always necessary because security associations can also
be introduced into ESP endpoints by configuration, or saved from previous
negotiations. Needless to say, if perfect forward secrecy is required, longer-term
parts of a security association can be re-used, but there must be a new key
exchange for symmetric keys.
4.3.3 Data integrity and confidentiality
In all three protocols, data and some headers are encrypted with a shared key by
the sender, and decrypted using the same key by the receiver. A different shared
key is used in each direction. According to the mathematics of symmetric-key
cryptography, encryption satisfies the requirement of data confidentiality.
The requirement of data integrity is satisfied by the process of “message
authentication.” Each packet is sent with a “message authentication code”
(MAC) computed from the authenticated data d by appending to the data a
shared authentication key k, and then applying a cryptographic hash function
(§4.2.1) to d+k. The MAC H(d+k) is then appended to the data in the packet.
As with encryption keys, all three protocols generate authentication keys during
key exchange, and use a different authentication key in each direction. The
packet receiver performs the same MAC computation and expects it to result in
the same MAC that it received in the packet. If an attacker inserts or changes
packets while they are being transmitted, it will not be able to compute correct
authentication codes for the packets, and the discrepancy will be detected by
the receiver.
This algorithm alone has the limitation that an attacker with access to the
packet stream can still delete, re-order, or replay packets, even though it cannot
create new ones. TLS and ESP require different solutions to this problem,
because of the differences in embedding visible in Figure 10.
One might think that this problem would be solved for TLS (both versions)
by the fact that the enclosing TCP packets have byte sequence numbers. TCP
headers are not encrypted, however, so an attacker-in-the-middle could alter
them to make even an altered TCP byte stream look correct. The actual TLS
solution is for each endpoint to keep track of packet sequence numbers as TLS
packets are sent and received. The sequence number is not transmitted directly,
but it is included in the bit string hashed to compute the MAC. For a packet to
be accepted, the receiver must be re-computing its MAC with the same sequence
number that the sender used. This works because TLS is embedded in TCP,
so the authenticated data and MAC are presented to the authenticator reliably
and in sending order.
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Message authentication in ESP and Quic must work differently, because
their packets may not be presented to the authenticator in sending order. In
these protocols, the headers contain explicit packet sequence numbers, which
are included in the data on which the MAC is computed. The authenticator
cannot predict the sequence number of the next packet it will see, so it cannot
detect deletion or re-ordering attacks (which, after all, might not be attacks but
flaws in the network). Rather, authentication checks only for received packets
with sequence numbers that have already been received, and deletes them. This
is sufficient to defend against replay attacks, which are part of many man-in-
the-middle attacks, because an attacker cannot change the sequence number of
a packet it replays.
4.3.4 Usage of cryptographic protocols
Almost all Web traffic is now encrypted, at least with TLS 1.2. Deployments of
TLS 1.3 and Quic are both growing rapidly, because of the motivation of shorter
setup times. TLS is also widely used by other application protocols. ESP is
most commonly used to make “virtual private networks” (see §7).
Some properties of the protocols are summarized in Figure 11. The TLS
entry covers both versions. Quic is like TLS except for message authentication,
in which it resembles ESP.
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Figure 11: Summary of protocol properties.
Not surprisingly, developers building applications on UDP are also interested
in endpoint security. For UDP transmission, there is a security protocol called
DTLS (Datagram Transport Layer Security) that is as similar as possible to
TLS. DTLS introduces the notion that a sequence of UDP packets go together
in a session, which is not present in plain UDP. It should be clear from the
previous sections that, because DTLS is not embedded in TCP, its designers
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had to solve two problems: (i) the TLS handshake assumes reliable delivery
of the handshake packets, and (ii) DTLS message authentication cannot rely
on the property that packets are delivered reliably, in order, and duplicate-
free, so that packet sequence numbers can be computed independently at each
endpoint. DTLS solves the first problem by incorporating packet-loss detection
and retransmission into the DTLS handshake. DTLS solves the second problem
by using explicit sequence numbers, exactly as ESP does.
Wireless networks have their own cryptographic protocols based on the same
principles. Security is particularly important for these networks, because any
machine within radio range has physical access to the broadcast links of the
network. When a new member joins a private wireless network, endpoint au-
thentication ensures that the new member is authorized.
Although cryptographic algorithms and protocols are proved mathemati-
cally, there is a big difference between mathematical abstractions and code. In
implementing the algorithms, efficiency is a top priority, and transformations
for efficiency can introduce bugs in addition to all the other bugs to which
software systems are prone. Advances in processor speeds and the exploitation
of side-channels are making it easier to crack codes, so that increases in key
lengths become necessary—not even counting the unpredictable disruption that
might be caused by quantum computing. Cryptographic libraries are improved
continually, but each machine is no more secure than its latest upgrade. It may
even be less secure, when it must use an older software version to communicate
with an infrequently-updated machine.
4.4 Interactions between cryptographic protocols and other
aspects of networking
Cryptographic protocols have significant interactions with other security pat-
terns, which will be discussed when the other security patterns have been pre-
sented. This section is concerned with the interactions of cryptographic pro-
tocols with network architecture and network services other than security. In
considering architectural and service interactions, we will be looking at multiple
composed networks as well as protocols within a single network.
4.4.1 Layering
A network with cryptographic session protocols can be layered on top of one or
more networks, as explained in §3.3. Because each underlay level can implement
an overlay link with a path of links, forwarders, and middleboxes, users of an
overlay network must accept that its packets can pass through many machines
and physical links unknown to them. But cryptographic protocols are designed
to work in completely adversarial environments such as these! Furthermore, the
cryptographic properties of a session can be assumed to hold for any link that it
implements, so the properties guaranteed by cryptographic protocols propagate
upward through layering.
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4.4.2 Performance
Data encryption and message authentication increase required bandwidth and
computational resources. The overhead is modest, so it is not a concern in all
cases. It is more likely to be a significant concern for battery-operated devices, or
for network elements that must decrypt and re-encrypt at high traffic volumes.
The most direct and significant performance costs of cryptographic protocols
are incurred in the setup phase, by endpoint authentication and key exchange,
which consume compute resources and increase latency. Even with short round-
trip times, a small fraction of TLS 1.2 setups take 300 ms or more [43], due to
increased computation time. We have seen that newer protocols have reduced
setup times aggressively, often by saving and re-using session state, but this
causes an inevitable loss of security [50].
The performance issue is much more serious in applications for the Internet
of Things (IoT), because these applications tend to have periodic or irregular
short communications from a large number of networked devices to centralized
analysis or publish/subscribe servers. Message Queuing Telemetry Transport,
a protocol for IoT applications, is well-designed from this perspective, because
many short application communications can share the same TLS session. Even
so, group events (such as initialization of a fleet of vehicles) can easily create
spikes in the load on centralized servers [24].
For Message Queuing Telemetry Transport and all other application proto-
cols with short or bursty communications separated by intervals of inactivity,
it is most efficient for many communications to share a single, long-lived se-
cure channel. Long-lived Internet channels have been difficult to maintain in
the past, because various components in the path of the channel would time
out and close the channel during intervals of inactivity. It is easier now—TCP,
TLS, and DTLS all have keep-alive options, sending periodic keep-alive signals
to keep long-lived channels open.
Architecturally, there are two ways to implement the optimization of sharing
a secure channel. The first way is to embed the application protocol in the secu-
rity protocol. For example, if TLS is the security protocol, application headers
and data would be the data portion of TLS packets, as shown in Figure 10.
Alternatively, an application network could be layered on IP networks, as
shown in Figure 12. The Session Initiation Protocol (SIP) is an application pro-
tocol for control of multimedia applications. The SIP application network has
links that are implemented by TLS sessions in the IP underlay. The big differ-
ence between this architecture and protocol embedding is that the TLS sessions
have different endpoints (different sources and destinations) than the SIP appli-
cation session does. This makes it more flexible than protocol embedding, for
two reasons: (i) The application network can insert its own middleboxes into
the path of the application session, as SIP always does. (ii) The TLS sessions
can last longer than any communication between two specific SIP endpoints,
and can be shared by communications between many SIP endpoint pairs. Re-
call that embedding and layering correspond to ESP transport mode and tunnel
mode, respectively.
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Figure 12: A SIP application network layered on bridged IP networks.
4.4.3 Session protocols
One significant issue in the use of cryptographic protocols is their relation-
ship to TCP, because TCP does so many things: congestion control, reliability,
and packet ordering. We have seen that TLS depends on being embedded in
TCP. This should not be a problem, unless real or perceived implementation
constraints cause designers to make bad choices. For example, some network
architectures use TCP as a session protocol in an overlay network with secure
links implemented by TLS. (In comparison, in Figure 12, the overlay network
uses SIP as the session protocol.) Because of the dependence of TLS on TCP,
this design is layering one instance of TCP over another instance of TCP! This
can cause the problem of “TCP meltdown” [25], as follows.
TCP provides reliability by detecting lost packets by means of a timer, and
requesting retransmission of a packet when it does not arrive in time. For each
session, TCP sets the timeout interval independently and adaptively. It can
happen that the timeout interval on the upper-level instance of TCP becomes
shorter than the timeout interval on the lower-level instance. In this case the
lower-level session is experiencing reduced throughput, because it is waiting a
longer time for each packet. At the same time, the upper-level session is having
frequent timeouts, making frequent requests for retransmission, and therefore
demanding increased throughput. This mismatch drastically degrades the end-
to-end throughput.
Another significant issue is the relationship between cryptographic protocols
and stateful firewalls in IP networks. Stateful firewalls record ongoing sessions
and use them to filter packets; for example, firewalls at the edges of private
networks are often configured to allow only two-way sessions initiated from
inside the network. To do this, the firewall must be able to tell which incoming
packets are in the same session as particular outgoing packets.
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The problem in IP networks is that session identifiers are not standardized
across all session protocols. All firewalls recognize TCP sessions, because the
first 32 bits of a TCP header consists of two port numbers, and a session is
identified by the IP destination name in each direction and its corresponding
port. In ESP, on the other hand, the first 32 bits of the protocol header are a
pointer to a security association (see §4.3.2), which is completely different in the
forward and reverse directions, and cannot be used to associate packets in the
two directions. The consequence is that a stateful firewall will not allow ESP
sessions.
In this case protocol composition enables a workaround to the problem. ESP,
whether in tunnel or transport mode, can be embedded in UDP with well-known
port 4500. (A well-known port for UDP/ESP composition is necessary because
UDP headers have no place for the “next header,” as IP and ESP headers do.)
In this way a two-way sequence of UDP packets forms an identifiable session,
and a stateful firewall does not see the ESP headers at all. Quic is already
embedded in UDP, and traverses stateful firewalls in the same way.
4.4.4 Mobility
In its strongest sense, mobility enables a session to persist even though the net-
work attachment of a device at its endpoint is changing. This usually means
that, at some level of the layering hierarchy, the network member on the device
is changing names within its network, or dying and being replaced by a member
of another network. For example, when a mobile phone moves from one cellular
provider’s network to another, its IP name (for data service) must change. Ide-
ally the data sessions of the phone would persist across such moves, as its voice
sessions do.
There is usually no interaction between mobility and cryptographic proto-
cols, because the identity of a mobile machine is at a higher level than the names
that change. For instance, consider a Web server running on a virtual machine
in a cloud. Because of failures or resource changes, the virtual machine may
migrate to a different physical machine where it has a different IP name. But
the identity of the Web server is its domain name, which is at a higher level and
does not change. Similarly, more than one server can have the same identity, as
when a Web site of origin delegates its identity to a content-delivery server by
sharing its certificate and keys.
On the other hand, thinking about mobility brings up the possibility of
normal mobility in reverse—the higher-level identity moves or changes while
the lower-level name remains the same. This can be a security issue: after Jane
Q. Public enters her password (§4.1), she might walk away from her machine,
and then any other person who walks by could retrieve her personal data and
request transactions on her bank account. For this reason, secure distributed
applications require periodic re-authentications of the identity of the person
using them, especially after idle periods.
30
4.4.5 Infrastructure control protocols
Control protocols are used by network infrastructure to maintain and distribute
network state. It is important to protect these protocols against subversion
attacks (§2.1.2).
Unsurprisingly, some control protocols incorporate cryptography. For in-
stance, Border Gateway Protocol Security is a security extension to BGP that
provides cryptographic verification of packets advertising routes. Similarly,
Domain Name System Security Extension protects DNS lookups by returning
records with digital signatures.
In many cases, however, it is difficult for control protocols to rely on cryp-
tography. An endpoint might not have a certificate or other credential to prove
its identity. The protocol might require high-speed, high-volume operation. Or,
the protocol might simply be too old to incorporate cryptography, even if it is
feasible.
In these cases there are lighter-weight measures that can help. Network
members that make requests should keep track of their pending requests and not
accept unsolicited replies. Replies should be checked for credibility, whenever
that is possible. Most effectively, a network member can include a nonce or
random field value in a session-initiation or request packet. Subsequent packets
of the session must have the same nonce or random value, so that no attacker
without access to the previous packets of the session can send packets purporting
to be part of it. Without the nonce, an attacker could do something to trigger
a query, then send a spurious answer to the query.
5 Traffic filtering
Traffic filtering is performed by forwarders and middleboxes that are part of a
network’s infrastructure. The network’s routing ensures that designated traffic
passes through one of these traffic filters, and the filter examines it for evidence
of flooding attacks, subversion attacks, or policy violations. If traffic seems to
be part of an attack, the filter takes some defensive action, most often simply
discarding the traffic.
Content-based traffic filtering (§5.1) looks at the contents of individual pack-
ets or sequences of packets. Path-based traffic filtering (§5.2) adds to this infor-
mation about the paths along which traffic has traveled.
As in §4, the usual context of the discussion in this section will be a single
network of any kind, or a set of similar bridged networks such as the bridged IP
networks of the Internet. After explaining traffic filtering in individual networks,
we return to the compositional view (§5.3), considering how traffic filtering
interacts with other network mechanisms and where it should be placed in a
compositional network architecture.
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5.1 Content-based traffic filtering
5.1.1 Signature-based-filtering criteria
Filtering criteria are predicates used to identify suspected traffic. Signature-
based filtering criteria examine specific header and data fields of packets. These
criteria are used to detect most policy violations and subversion attacks. Often
the criteria are Boolean combinations of simple predicates such as destination-
Port = 80 on the values of IP header fields. For example, suppose that an IP
“firewall” (traffic filter) at the edge of a network is enforcing this policy: the
only external traffic is for Web accesses, which of course require DNS queries.
The direction of a packet (inbound or outbound) can be determined from its
source and destination names or from the link on which it arrives. The firewall
might be configured with these four rules:
1. Drop all outbound TCP packets unless they have destination port 80.
2. Drop all inbound TCP packets unless they have source port 80 and the
TCP ACK bit is set.
3. Drop all outbound UDP packets unless they have destination port 53.
4. Drop all inbound UDP packets unless they have source port 53.
In the second rule, the ACK bit indicates that this packet is an acknowledgment
of a previous packet, meaning that it is not a TCP SYN packet.
These rules are sufficient for the purpose if all packets through the firewall
obey the TCP protocol exactly, but of course an attacker may not be so polite.
A safer approach would be to make the firewall stateful by having it maintain
a table of all ongoing TCP connections. Then the second rule above would be
replaced by “Drop all inbound TCP packets unless their source and destination
names and ports identify them as belong to an ongoing TCP session.” If a
firewall is stateful, it is crucial that all packets of a session pass through the
same firewall. This property is called “session affinity.”
For reference throughout §5.1, Figure 13 is a table summarizing characteris-
tics of four common types of traffic filter in IP networks. The classification is at
least as much historical and marketing-oriented as it is technical! It is a list of
products that have sold well in the past, not a prescriptive list of which options
are possible.
IP routers sometimes do dual duty as traffic filters. To do this, they are con-
figured with predicates on packet headers, called “access control lists.” Routers
must work even faster than firewalls, so they do not perform stateful filtering.
For filtering that looks at packet data as well as headers, networks often use
commercial products known as “intrusion detection systems” and “intrusion
prevention systems.” These filters can use any filtering criteria for any purpose.
Signature-based filters against spam and viruses look for keywords, sometimes
keywords in specific positions, and other known attack patterns. Their criteria
can include regular expressions matching fields of arbitrary length. They can
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Figure 13: Examples of common traffic filters in IP networks.
also be stateful, and check whether protocols are being followed. These filters
can be valuable commercial products because of the intellectual property in
their filtering criteria. Like all security software, to be effective, they must be
kept up-to-date.
In the common case that TCP sessions are being filtered for subversion at-
tacks or policy violations, the filter should reconstruct the correct byte stream
(restoring packet order, replacing lost bytes by retransmitted ones) before filter-
ing. If there is no reconstruction, attackers can hide attacks simply by splitting
attack data over multiple packets. Even if there is reconstruction, there may be
ambiguities exploitable by attackers. For example, if there are missing packets,
some bytes may be retransmitted and received twice. An attacker can engi-
neer the transmitted stream so that some bytes will have to be sent twice, and
place attack bytes only in the second transmission. The filter might check only
the first bytes, and the receiver might use only the second bytes. The surest
way to avoid all such ambiguities is to have a “traffic normalizer” middlebox
in the session path, before both filter and destination, to reconstruct a single
unambiguous packet stream received by both of them [23].
One advantage enjoyed by TCP filters is that attacks require communication
in both directions. Consequently, attackers cannot easily hide by giving false
source names—if they did, there would be no two-way commnication. The
sources of flooding attacks, on the other hand, can hide themselves behind false
source names. This problem is also an opportunity, because having a false
source name is a good indicator that a packet is part of a flooding attack.
Forwarders (and other filters associated with them) are well-situated for using
this as a filtering criteria, because forwarders have information about routing.
For example, “ingress filters” in IP networks check incoming packets to see if the
prefixes of their source names match expectations. This is an excellent addition
to an access network, which may have detailed knowledge of its user members,
or an Internet service provider’s network, which knows the IP prefixes allocated
to each access network bridged with it. “Unicast reverse path forwarding” in
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a forwarder accepts a packet’s source name as valid only if its forwarding table
specifies forwarding to the source name on the same two-way link on which the
packet arrived. Unfortunately reverse-path checking cannot be used in the high-
speed core of the Internet, because routes there are not necessarily symmetric.
5.1.2 Measurement and statistical analysis
Signature-based filtering criteria have two major limitations: they cannot de-
tect new (called “zero day”) attacks, and it is difficult to use them to detect
flooding attacks, whose individual packets look normal (with the exception of
false source names). In response to these limitations, forwarders collect data
on large amounts of traffic, and send it to other network members for analysis.
Analysis can measure attributes over large collections of packets. It can then
look for known attack patterns, especially of flooding attacks; for example, a
single destination receiving a large number of response packets from many dif-
ferent sources may be the victim of a reflection attack (§2.1.1). Analysis can
also detect anomalies, which are new divergences from normal traffic patterns
that may indicate new attacks. Anomaly detection uses statistical algorithms,
including machine learning.
For typical traffic measurement in IP networks, routers collect selected data
and send it to analyzers in some well-known record format such as NetFlow
or IP Flow Information Export (IPFIX). Data can be collected at multiple
locations and different levels of granularity. The volume of data can be reduced
by recording only headers (rather than entire packets), by sampling the packets
(rather than collecting information about all packets), or by focusing on specific
subsets of the packets. Most importantly, a flow comprises a group of packets
close together in time that have various header fields in common. Creating a
single record for a flow helps reduce the volume of data while still providing a
timely and detailed view of the network traffic.
Anomaly detection is a very attractive idea, but it is also very difficult in
practice. One major reason is that normal Internet traffic is highly variable, not
to mention unusual-but-innocent occurrences such as congestion due to failures,
or a legitimate flash crowd [38]. The other major reason is that the cost of
mistakes (“false positives”) is high, as many legitimate packets are discarded.
The best use of anomaly detection may be to discover and understand new
attacks, then turn their characteristics into signatures or measurable patterns
[52].
5.1.3 Default-reject filtering
Because the quality of filtering criteria is such a limiting factor, some of the
research on flooding attacks aims to make filtering criteria precise by recogniz-
ing certain packets as desirable and rejecting all other packets. We’ll call this
approach “default-reject” filtering, in contrast to usual filtering with the default
behavior of accepting a packet. In addition to precision, default-reject filtering
claims the advantage of preventing flooding attacks, rather than reacting to
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them well after they have begun.
The limitation of default-reject filtering is that it only works in limited con-
texts, where desirable packets can be recognized. For instance, Secure Overlay
Services [30] is a default-reject proposal for public emergencies, in which all
normal traffic is suspended and protected servers should be reached by emer-
gency responders only. Another example, Ethane [11], is intended for private
IP networks where control software has very complete knowledge, including the
network’s user members, the people who use the machines, and the peoples’
roles in the organization that the network serves. With this much information
to work with, it is possible to write very precise rules about which communica-
tions should be allowed.
5.1.4 Defensive actions
Obviously, the most common defensive action that a filter can take is to drop
packets, but there are other possibilities.
The only difference between “intrusion detection systems” and “intrusion
prevention systems” is that detection systems only raise alarms, while preven-
tion systems automatically take action against suspected attacks. It might seem
that automatic action is always better (it is certainly faster), but there are good
reasons for keeping operators and enterprise customers in the decision loop. If
a suspected attack is a false positive, much legitimate traffic may be dropped.
If an operator deploys additional resources on behalf of an enterprise customer
that is under attack, the customer will have to pay for them. In rare cases,
the defense against a suspected attack may even be a counter-attack, which is
wrong and even dangerous (in a military setting) if not well-justified.
What actions are normally taken by intrusion prevention systems, other
than dropping packets? If there is uncertainty about the packets, a filter can
rate-limit them or downgrade their forwarding priority rather than dropping
them. Rather than dropping session-initiation requests, a filter could reply to
them with refusals, which would discourage retries. A refusal to a TCP SYN
(request) is a TCP RST (reset). A refusal to an HTTP request is an error code.
Finally, when filtering is being used to defend against policy violations, some-
times the filter records packets for the purposes of investigation and legal ev-
idence. Recorded packets are usually not dropped but forwarded on to their
destinations, to keep the investigation secret from its targets until it has been
completed.
5.1.5 Resources and capacity
Traffic filtering expends a lot of network resources, so the detailed design of
a traffic-filtering mechanism must be resource-sensitive. How does a network
ensure that its traffic filters do not themselves become traffic bottlenecks during
flooding attacks?
There are two approaches to providing sufficient filtering capacity. The first
is to host traffic filters on high-capacity machines dedicated to this purpose.
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The second is to run traffic filters on virtual machines in a cloud. In this
approach it is possible to implement “dynamic scale-out,” which means that as
the load increases during an attack, more virtual machines are allocated for the
filtering task. All the filter types in Figure 13 have been implemented with both
approaches, although the high-capacity-machine approach is more often applied
to routers and firewalls.
The situation today is fluid, as flooding attacks are becoming more severe. A
recent flooding attack on a number of DNS servers [17], including amplification,
generated traffic at 10-20 times normal volume, with bursts up to 40-50 times
normal volume, and reportedly a maximum of 1.2 Tbps (1200 Gbps). To provide
some intuition about the resources needed to handle such attacks, Figure 14
shows some typical capacities for servers and various kinds of traffic filters.
TYPE OF PACKET FILTER OR SERVER APPROXIMATE CAPACITY
target server
intrusion prevention system
(reconstructs byte stream)
stateful rewall (examines headers only)
IP router with access-control list
1 - 10 Gbps / core
1 - 20 Gbps / core
20 Gbps / core
100 Gbps / link
Figure 14: Data-processing capacities of common traffic filters and servers.
Of course these numbers are subject to frequent change. On the positive side,
converting an algorithm from software to programmable hardware increases its
speed by a factor of about 10, as does converting it from programmable hard-
ware to fixed-function hardware. On the negative side, commercial intrusion-
prevention systems frequently fall short of advertised capacity. There are ad-
versarial workloads designed so that the TCP byte stream is especially difficult
to reconstruct. More commonly, rule-checking is the performance problem, be-
cause it is more expensive than reconstructing the byte stream; performance is
improved when necessary by dropping rules.
5.2 Path-based traffic filtering
Path-based traffic filtering augments filtering criteria based on the contents of
packets, as discussed in the previous section, with criteria based on the path
along which packets traveled. There are two reasons for introducing path-based
filtering. The first reason is that path information can improve the precision
of filtering criteria, so that fewer good packets are accidentally included. For
example, say that the overall load on a server suggests a flooding attack, and
intrusion detection proposes a candidate filtering rule based on packet contents.
If we know that most paths to the server are delivering a trickle of these packets,
and one path’s load is dominated by these packets, there is a good chance that
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only the packets on the dominated path are attack packets.
The second reason for path-based filtering is that it may be possible to filter
out attack packets closer to their sources, which reduces the damage they do.
This section will discuss the trade-offs, why path-based filtering is not much
used today, and why it might be used more in the future.
5.2.1 Tracing attacks back to their sources
In IP networks, because of spoofing, the source name in a packet is not a reliable
indicator of where it came from. The purpose of a traceback mechanism is
to determine the path along which an attack packet travels. In other words,
traceback associates path meta-data with packets.2
From the viewpoint of a victim of a flooding attack, the network is a directed
acyclic graph with many possible packet sources and a single packet sink. Often
the graph is a tree, with the victim at the root. The interior of the graph consists
of forwarders and middleboxes, connected by links carrying traffic toward the
victim. Figure 15 shows such a graph for attack victim T . In the figure, member
names also stand for names of machines.
T
S2
S1
transit
network
access
network
of T
access
network
of S1
access
network
of S2
home
network
of S2
Figure 15: Paths from packet sources S1 and S2 to an attack victim T .
Figure 15 illustrates some relevant distinctions. The access network of a
machine is the first network in all its outgoing paths whose administrative au-
2The Accountable Internet proposal (§4.2.1) recommends authenticated source names so
that, among other reasons, traceback is not needed.
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thority is different from the owner of the machine (assuming for simplicity that
that there is only one such network). The access network of a machine is sig-
nificant because it is the first network that is able to filter outgoing packets of
the machine. Often the machine belongs to its access network, as T and S1
do. Sometimes, however, the first network of a machine (for example S2) is a
home network whose administrative authority is the same as the owner of the
machine. In this case the machine has separate home and access networks.
The simplest traceback mechanism is the Internet Control Message Protocol
Traceback packet. The idea is that each forwarder samples the packets it is
forwarding, with a very low sampling rate. When a packet is chosen, the for-
warder encloses the whole packet, along with the names of itself, the preceding
forwarder, and the succeeding one, in a Traceback packet, and sends it to the
packet destination. The idea is that the victim or a nearby helper will recon-
struct whole paths and maintain a running view of where its packets are coming
from. In addition to cumulative overhead, the chief disadvantage of Traceback
packets is that attackers could forge them. To prevent this, the sources of Trace-
back packets must be authenticated with public-key cryptography, introducing
significant additional overhead.
In other traceback mechanisms, forwarders mark the packets themselves with
path information as they are forwarded toward the victim. The markings allow
the victim or a helper near the victim to reconstruct the path along which
packets of an attack traveled.
The design of these traceback mechanisms entails many trade-offs. In the
remainder of this section we use representative proposals to illustrate the issues
and indicate some of the trade-offs, without declaring any particular winners.
Internet measurements indicate that the average-length path has 10-15 for-
warders, and 20-25 is a practical maximum [12]. It would take a large amount
of space in packets to represent full paths. One design allocates space in packets
to record only a single forwarder (32 bits for an IP name), and uses probabilis-
tic marking, in which each forwarder marks a packet with probability p, say
0.04 [48]. Because forwarders late in the path overwrite the marks of earlier
forwarders when they mark, the forwarders in a path can be ordered by the
frequency of their marks. The disadvantages of simple probabilistic marking
are:
• A path cannot be reconstructed until hundreds or thousands of attack
packets have been received.
• The attack signature may very well include attack packets from more
than one source, because of botnets and coordinated attacks. If there are
multiple attack paths to a target, then collectively they will form a tree.
Mark frequency is not enough information to reconstruct a tree, because
mark frequencies only result in a linear order.
The final IP Traceback design [48] deals with the problem of multiple attack
paths in simple probabilistic marking by encoding edges (node pairs representing
links) in the tree rather than nodes. The resulting doubling of the space needed
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for marks is dealt with by very aggressive compression techniques, primarily
making each mark field contain only a fragment of the full-size mark. This
reduces the mark field to 16 bits, but has the effect that many more packets
must be received before the path can be reconstructed. Even so, simulations
show that a path of length 15 can almost always be reconstructed after the victim
or its representative has received 2500 attack packets. The main disadvantage of
this is that the reconstructed tree of multiple attack paths becomes the solution
to a large combinatorial puzzle.
The Pi design [56] has every forwarder (at least, within a specified path
segment) mark the packet. Because the mark encodes the entire path (or seg-
ment), the victim’s helper need only receive one marked packet to have all the
information available about the path. Deterministic marking is combined with
very aggressive compression of the mark field, again down to 16 bits. Primarily,
compression in this proposal means that more than one path can result in the
same mark. The disadvantages of Pi are:
• Marks do not have enough information to reconstruct paths, only to dis-
tinguish equivalence classes of paths (all the possible paths that happen
to map to the same mark). So marks are not helpful in locating or dis-
tributing traffic filters—all the filtering must be done near the victim.
• Marking and filtering require choosing three parameters, each difficult
to choose in general and having interactions with many other factors,
including the ability of attackers to inject deceptive information.
In Active Internet Traffic Filtering [4], every packet is marked with full
names, but usually only by the egress forwarder at the edge of the source’s
access network, and the ingress forwarder at the target’s access network. If
a source/destination pair seems to distinguish an attack, a controller in the
target’s network will request both the target-network forwarder and the source-
network forwarder to drop such packets (see below). The source-network for-
warder includes a nonce in the mark, and the controller copies it into the request,
which is how request packets are secured (as in §4.4.5).
5.2.2 Filtering upstream
In the Internet, at any given time, there is a relatively small number of targets
for active flooding attacks. To defend a target against these attacks, traffic
filters can conceivably be placed in the graph of paths downstream, near the
target, or upstream, near packet sources. There are three main advantages to
placing traffic filters upstream:
• If filtering is farther from the target, the damage done by attack traffic is
lessened, because attack traffic is carried for shorter distances along fewer
links. Note that the damage of a flooding attack is not limited to the
intended target, because traffic to many other destinations will also suffer
because of congested links.
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• If a traffic filter is close to sources of attack traffic, it may have more
information about the sources. The access network sees all of a suspected
source’s traffic, so attack patterns are more likely to be detectable. An
access network may also know more about the type and reputation of
its sources (device type is relevant because some operating systems and
vendor hardware are more easily penetrated than others). More precise
filtering means less collateral damage.
• Very often, attack packets are coming from a botnet, with a large num-
ber of sources well-distributed across the public Internet. So the total
amount of available filtering resources near sources greatly exceeds the
total amount of resources available near a target.
A third option, filtering in the topological core of the network, is never used be-
cause the core is a region of high-speed links and high-speed forwarders handling
large numbers of packets. The required speed of filtering, and the potentially
large number of filtering rules to be checked, makes this option infeasible.
Pushback [38] is a simple scheme for reducing overall congestion by pushing
filtering upstream. At a forwarder, congestion on an outgoing link is diagnosed
when there is frequent packet loss (packets must be dropped because there is no
room for them in the link’s output queue). If a particular aggregate of packets
is responsible for a significant portion of the link’s traffic, then a predicate
describing the aggregate becomes a filtering criterion. The forwarder sends
upstream, on all its input links carrying packets in the aggregate, a request
to rate-limit these packets. Upstream forwarders can also request pushback
recursively, so pushback incorporates its own traceback mechanism. By rate-
limiting only specific aggregates along specific paths, pushback aims to do just
enough to protect other traffic, while limiting collateral damage.
The Active Internet Traffic Filtering proposal [4] employs upstream filtering
because it is particularly concerned with the botnet case, and with using the
many forwarders in the access networks of bots to help filter. There are several
ways in which its basic idea (above) must be augmented to make it reliable and
secure. First, the request and acknowledgment packets of the control protocol
itself could be used to flood a network, so they must be rate-limited. Second,
there is a set of mechanisms through which forwarders are monitored to see
if they are keeping their filtering promises, and through which filtering can be
delegated to other forwarders along an attack path.
5.2.3 Capabilities
In the long struggle to defend public servers against flooding attacks, researchers
have explored an alternative approach based on “capabilities” (a capability is
an unforgeable record showing the rights of the bearer). The idea behind capa-
bilities is that no source should be able to send Internet packets to a destination
unless the destination has already approved the transmission.
As applied to the protection of a public server accessed through TCP, the
TCP SYN is interpreted as a send request to the destination. Unless the source
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is already on a blacklist, the server will grant permission to send a limited
number of packets in a limited period of time, and reply to the SYN with a
capability attesting to the permission. The sender includes the capability in
subsequent packets, and forwarders on the path enforce the capability policies.
The destination can grant permission for more packets later, if they are needed
and the source has been well-behaved. Packets with no capabilities, expired
capabilities, or incorrect capabilities may be delivered, but with the very lowest
priority.
An example of this approach is the Traffic Validation Architecture [57]. The
architecture includes elaborate mechanisms to ensure that capabilities cannot
be forged by attackers, and cannot be transferred to other attackers. It includes
mechanisms to reduce the amount of space needed in packets for capabilities,
which can be considerable. It also has mechanisms for reducing the amount of
state in forwarders required to implement the security measures and to track
packets sent and time elapsed.
The principal problem with capabilities is session requests, which cannot be
controlled with capabilities and can be used on their own to create flooding at-
tacks. The Traffic Validation Architecture handles this problem by rate-limiting
request packets to 5% of the total volume. It can be shown, however, that this
just turns a flood of request packets into a denial-of-capabilities attack, in which
legitimate senders cannot get their requests through [5].
5.2.4 Filtering downstream
The advantages of filtering upstream are balanced by two major disadvantages:
• Upstream networks may not have sufficient incentive to use their resources
to protect targets that are remote from them. It has been argued that
networks under attack might be more willing to accept incoming pack-
ets from cooperating upstream networks, which will give the users of the
upstream networks better service [4]. Historically, however, cooperation
between the networks of different operators has been scarce [22].
• Even if source networks are willing to cooperate with target networks,
the necessary coordination is not easy. Previous sections have illustrated
many forms of overhead and many security vulnerabilities introduced by
coordination.
The proposals for moving filtering toward the sources of attack traffic date
from the early 2000s. In the 2010s cloud computing advanced so far that it
altered the evaluation of trade-offs decisively. Now almost all traffic filtering
is performed on behalf of the access networks of attack targets. It is usually
performed in clouds, with virtualized filters and dynamic scale-out. Sequenced
filters allow simple filters to deflect suspicious packets to complex filters for more
detailed screening.
The reader might be wondering why we went through all the detail of §5.2.1
through §5.2.3 if most of it is irrelevant today. The point is that it was made
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irrelevant by technology changes that altered the evaluation of trade-offs, and
technology changes in networking are not finished. Future changes could easily
make old solutions interesting again. Here are three examples:
• If the Internet evolves to offer more paths with reserved bandwidth for
real-time applications, then capabilities might be an excellent approach to
securing the use of reserved paths.
• Individual IP networks (under single ownership) now seem to be growing
in size and geographical scope. If this trend continues, it will become
more common for both the upstream and downstream segments of a path
to an attack target to be controlled by the same operator. If so, then the
administrative barriers to upstream filtering will disappear.
• Most traceback proposals require IP forwarders to perform new functions—
marking and filtering packets in new ways. Now that programmable for-
warders are coming into more common use, it will become much easier for
network operators to experiment with traceback and other such schemes.
5.3 Interactions between traffic filtering and other aspects
of networking
5.3.1 Routing
For a filtering tree or graph (as in Figure 15) to work correctly, all packets
destined for the protected target must pass through one or more forwarders or
middleboxes acting as filters, in accordance with the intended design. This is the
province of routing, which populates the forwarding tables used by forwarders.
Routing is performed in several different ways—sometimes by a distributed al-
gorithm that forwarders run among themselves, and sometimes by a centralized
algorithm running in a separate controller.
Routing packets through a filtering tree may seem straightforward, but there
is a different tree for each destination, and routing algorithms are also concerned
with reachability, performance, fault-tolerance, and other policy constraints.
For this reason, there has been considerable research on verifying that forward-
ing tables are correct, or on generating them correctly, where the correctness
criteria include “waypointing” constraints about steering packets through filters
[7, 8, 18, 29, 37].
Another issue that complicates routing through a filtering tree is the fact
that many traffic filters require session affinity—all the packets of a session, in
both directions, must go through the same filter. Wide-area routing frequently
creates different paths for packets traveling in different directions between the
same two endpoints. Even packets traveling in the same direction may be spread
across multiple paths because there has been a failure in one of the paths, or a
need for better load-balancing. Within a cloud, where many virtual machines
are running the same filtering software for scalability, a session can be assigned
to any virtual machine. The assignment must be remembered, however, so that
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all packets of the session are steered in the right direction. Shortcuts such as
“assign a session to one of four virtual machines based on the last two bits of
some identifier” work well in static situations, but fail when filtering resources
must be scaled up or down because of fluctuations in load.
5.3.2 Layering
Almost always, a packet arriving at a machine is being transmitted through
multiple layered networks simultaneously, for example an Ethernet local area
network, an IP network, and an application network. Figures 3 and 6 combined
illustrate this simple example. In addition, layered between the application
network and the lowest IP network there is often a virtual private network
(§7.2.2) or other IP network. If the machine is actually a virtual machine in a
multi-tenant cloud, there is sure to be at least one network between the tenant’s
IP network and the Ethernet, with the job of sharing cloud resources among all
tenants.
The layers are significant because attacks can take place in any of them.
This is both a challenge and an opportunity. If only packets in the lower layers
are filtered, then many higher-level attacks will be concealed in the higher-
level packets, which are mere data to the lower-level networks. For example,
recall that IP intrusion detection systems look into packet contents for signs of
malware at specific locations. These systems are assuming there are no networks
layered between the filtering network and the application network; if there are
additional networks, then the packet formats will be different, and the filtering
criteria will be useless.
On the other hand, much can be gained by filtering packets separately in
each network. Already there are special filters for Web requests and email
messages, which are packets in their own application-oriented networks. These
filters are deployed as middleboxes in these networks. This idea can be ex-
tended to intermediary layers, where each filter is attuned to the configuration,
protocols, and vulnerabilities of its particular network. It is often possible to
optimize architectures so that filters at multiple levels can be located on the
same machines.
The second interaction between filtering and layering concerns networks be-
low the filtering network in the layer hierarchy. Imagine that you have designed
a filtering mechanism within a network, and convinced yourself that it is cor-
rect. Your argument concerns (among other things) paths in the network to
a potential attack target, and shows that routing places an appropriate traffic
filter in every path.
Whether you remembered to state it or not, your argument that no (or a
limited number of) attack packets reach the target depends on the assumption
that attack packets do not suddenly appear inside the perimeter of traffic fil-
ters. It is easy enough to check that the network members inside the perimeter
are part of the network infrastructure and therefore trusted, but what about
the links? It must be ensured that no packet is received on trusted link that
was not sent on the link. If the link is implemented rather than physical, it
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must be proved that the implementing network does not inject packets into the
implementation of the link.
This might seem like a fanciful concern, but it is not. An Ethernet can
be penetrated physically, and it is easy to make a penetrated Ethernet inject
packets into the links of networks layered on it [32]. In a multi-tenant cloud, the
links of a tenant’s network (where the filtering will take place) are virtual links
implemented by sessions in the lower-level network that shares resources among
tenants. If the cloud network does not isolate tenants properly, then packets
sent by virtual machines of a different tenant could be delivered as part of this
tenant’s sessions.
5.3.3 Cryptographic protocols
There is a profound interaction between cryptographic protocols and traffic fil-
tering. If a user session is encrypted, then middleboxes in general, and traffic
filters in particular, cannot read anything in the session packets beyond their
headers. One response to this interaction is increased interest in filtering based
on traffic attributes that encryption does not change, e.g., packet timing and
sizes. It may be too early to tell how effective this will be as a defense, consid-
ering that its recognized successes are spying and tampering attacks [42].
In some cases the relationship between users and filters is not adversarial,
and there are three techniques for managing this interaction in more-or-less
cooperative cases. Before presenting these techniques, we will explain the inter-
ested parties and their powers. We can think of their interactions as a game,
one instance of which is illustrated by Figure 16. At the top of the figure we
see what the initiating user can do. It chooses the acceptor of the session, and
if the acceptor agrees, the data of the session will be encrypted end-to-end.
encrypted
acceptorinitiator
for
perfor-
mance
against
users
against
users
against
users
for
acceptor
NETWORK
MIDDLEBOXES
MALICIOUS
USERS
A B
C
D E
initiator’s region acceptor’s region
Figure 16: A game: cryptographic protocols versus traffic filtering.
At the second level of the figure, we see what the network can do. The
network has the power to insert middleboxes anywhere in the path of the user
session, simply by routing session packets through them. The figure shows some
common middleboxes, inserted in likely places, which are often in regions of the
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session path near the two endpoints. A middlebox might have the purpose
of enhancing performance, for example by caching or compression (B). For
maximum effectiveness, it should be placed near the initiator, as shown. A
middlebox might be a traffic filter, with the purpose of protecting the acceptor
from subversion attacks or policy violations that might damage it (E). This
middlebox will probably be placed near the acceptor. Finally, the network
might insert traffic filters that are working against the interests of the initiator
and acceptor, either by preventing them from violating policies, or by spying on
or tampering with their communication (A and D). These middleboxes might
be placed in either region.
At the third level of the figure, we see that other malicious parties can also
insert middleboxes in the path by various techniques such as wiretapping, for
the purposes of spying and tampering (C). Fortunately, physical security and
security mechanisms in other networks constrain such attacks. In the illustrated
example, a malicious party is able to eavesdrop in the middle of the session path,
but not near the endpoints.
If network middleboxes are working on behalf of the user endpoints of an
encrypted session, and if they need to read data to do their work, then the
cleanest arrangement is to make the middleboxes part of an application-oriented
overlay network. This is illustrated by a SIP network in Figure 12. In the figure,
data traveling on the links of the SIP network is encrypted by TLS in the IP
networks, but each middlebox in the SIP network receives and sends plaintext.
The second and third techniques can be deployed within the bridged IP net-
works of the Internet. In the second technique, the network introduces another
middlebox that is a proxy. The proxy would accept the initiator’s TLS session
and make a TCP session between itself and the original acceptor. The proxy
would decrypt packets from the initiator and send their contents in plaintext
packets to the acceptor, so they could be read by any middleboxes in the path
of the TCP session.
If the acceptor is a public server, the limitation on this technique is that the
acceptor must trust and approve of the proxy, so that the server is willing to
lend the proxy its identity and secret keys. So the only place in Figure 16 that
a proxy could plausibly be inserted is between D and E.
The general idea of proxies that cooperate with endpoints is developed fur-
ther in Middlebox TLS (mbTLS) [44]. In this approach all middleboxes must
be proxies, and they create a session consisting of an end-to-end chain of simple
TCP sessions. Along the chain from initiator to acceptor, there is first a set
of middleboxes inserted on behalf of the initiator, followed by a set inserted on
behalf of the acceptor (see Figure 17).
Within the end-to-end chain of TCP sessions, the initiator and acceptor first
have a normal end-to-end TLS handshake for endpoint authentication and key
exchange. Then each middlebox initiates a secondary TLS handshake with the
next element in the direction of its sponsoring endpoint. For example, if there
are two middleboxes M1 and M2 inserted on behalf of the initiator, M2 initiates a
secondary handshake with M1, and M1 with the initiator. The secondary hand-
shakes exchange symmetric and authentication keys for the individual simple
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Figure 17: Control signaling to set up an mbTLS session.
sessions. They can also perform endpoint authentication of middlebox identity
(in this case the responsible owner), software version and configuration, security
properties of the hardware/software platform, etc. This makes sense because
the middleboxes associated with each endpoint are working in cooperation with
it, even if they have an adversarial relationship with the middleboxes of the
other endpoint.
After the secondary TLS handshakes, data is transmitted. In each middlebox
data is decrypted, processed as plaintext by the middlebox application code,
then encrypted again for the next hop.3 Note that the “midpoint” simple session
between initiator and acceptor middleboxes has no secondary handshake; in this
simple session, the keys chosen by the primary TLS handshake are used.
The third and final technique aims to preserve both middlebox functional-
ity and user privacy, based on new results in cryptography. At one extreme,
fully homomorphic encryption [20] makes it possible to compute any function
on encrypted data without learning more about the data than the function’s
value. Although fully homomorphic encryption is currently impractical (it is
too expensive computationally, by orders of magnitude), there are less capable
algorithms for computing functions on encrypted data with performance that
may be feasible for current use.
BlindBox [51] is a proposal for allowing middleboxes to operate on encrypted
data. BlindBox middleboxes can apply detection rules of the kind commonly
used by virus scanners, intrusion-detection systems, and parental filters. The
scheme also allows a middlebox that has found a keyword or other suspicious
string, as probable cause of a security violation, to decrypt the entire packet.
BlindBox is implemented as an extension of TLS. In addition to the basic
TLS handshake, endpoints must generate extra keys. The data must be sent
end-to-end twice (redundantly), once in the ordinary TLS form and once in a
reformatted and re-encrypted form suitable for the BlindBox algorithms.
The biggest overhead incurred by BlindBox is due to rule preparation, be-
cause the middlebox must have the rules themselves encrypted with a session-
dependent key. The endpoints must not know the rules (this would make them
easier to evade) and the middlebox must not know the key (otherwise the guar-
3An earlier version, Multi-Context TLS [45], allowed the endpoints to place constraints on
the read/write access of middleboxes.
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antee of data confidentiality would be lost). So who can encrypt the rules? For
every keyword in every rule, both endpoints must generate and transmit to the
middlebox a special encryption function that incorporates yet obfuscates the
session-dependent key. The middlebox must first check the two for agreement
(in case one of the endpoints is insecure) and then apply the encryption function
to the rule. This results in very high performance overhead, which means that
BlindBox is currently practical only for long-lived sessions or small rule sets.
Although both Middlebox TLS and BlindBox are promising efforts, it seems
clear that their complexity and non-uniform communication among participants
are weaknesses. Complexity itself is a security vulnerability, because it provides
a larger “attack surface” for adversaries to probe.
5.3.4 Session protocols
There is a general problem affecting all protocols of the IP protocol suite: When
a new network feature requires additional information in packets, where can the
information be put? Inventors do not wish to increase packet size, and want
their proposals to have backward compatibility. So they generally choose to
fit their information into some “unused” field in current header formats. For
example, both IP Traceback [48] and Pi [56] squeeze traceback information into
the 16-bit identification field in the IP packet header. The original use of this
field is to group fragments of a fragmented packet so they can be re-assembled
at their destination. It is declared “unused” on the grounds that fragmentation
of IP packets is now rare.
The irony of such proposals is that so many new features and protocol vari-
ations use the same “unused” fields. At the same time, inventors of other
new functions have no compunction in deleting this “unused” information from
packets when it is convenient. For example, a server using SYN cookies (§6)
effectively drops all optional information in TCP SYN packets, which means
that any network feature relying on extensions to TCP is disabled. Note that
many servers using SYN cookies are Web servers, and many new features relying
on extensions to TCP (such as Multipath TCP [46], just to name one example)
have improved Web access as a major use case.
A possible solution to such problems is a generalized mechanism for com-
position of session protocols. This mechanism would build on the structures of
Figure 4. If all session protocols could be composed freely, then all new features
requiring space in packets could be introduced—without fear of interference—as
new, composable session protocols. For instance, just as TLS is composed with
(embedded in) TCP, TCP could be composed with (embedded in) Multipath
TCP. TCP would control transmission of byte streams along individual paths,
while Multipath TCP would coordinate the multiple byte streams. Unfortu-
nately this solution may not be backward-compatible, and also raises concerns
about generating packets that exceed the maximum packet size of their network.
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6 Dynamic resource allocation
Because flooding attacks are resource wars, both network infrastructure and
user members can defend against them by allocating more resources when they
are under attack. Cloud computing has made it easier for networks to scale out
traffic filters, and for users to scale out servers. Even in server-centric defenses
the network is usually involved, for two reasons: (i) even when server resources
are sufficient to absorb an attack, network bandwidth must also be sufficient to
handle the attack, and (ii) the network provides the service of distributing the
load across servers.
Dynamic resource allocation works better if resource replicas are geograph-
ically distributed, so that some replicas can be reached when other parts of the
network are too congested. Because attacks on DNS servers are so common
and damaging, it is especially important to have distributed authoritative DNS
servers for popular domain names. Queries are distributed across the replicas by
means of IP anycast. If there are five replicas sharing the load and one has been
overwhelmed by an attack, IP anycast may not be dynamic enough to redirect
queries away from the failed replica, but at least queries directed by anycast
to the other four will succeed. In Figure 18 there are three authoritative DNS
servers for the domain example.com; IP anycast directs the client’s query to the
closest one.
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Figure 18: Resource replication in a content-delivery network. All member labels
symbolize IP names, so the three DNS servers have the same name.
A “content-delivery network” provides many replicas of its customers’ con-
tent, geographically distributed so that the latency of content delivery to each
client is minimized. In Figure 18 the authoritative DNS servers for customer
domain example.com are aware that its content is available at servers A through
D, and also maintain information about location and recent performance of the
servers. So each DNS server can return to a client the IP name of the best
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content server for it to contact.
Replication of service resources is easiest when servers are responding to
queries based on fairly static data. When queries can update service data, the
service implementation must do extra work to keep the data replicas in some
adequate state of consistency. (The study of distributed computing has pro-
duced many algorithms for replicated data, satisfying many different definitions
of consistency.) In some cases dynamic data can be distributed across multiple
sites more easily by sharding, e.g., by partitioning the keys of a key-value store
so that each site is responsible for a subset of the keys. No one key-value pair
will be replicated, but the total resources available will be greater.
Instead of dynamically allocating more server resources during attacks, the
same result can be achieved by dynamically reducing the work per request that
servers perform. For example, a flood of DNS queries is amplified when servers
query other servers. A very effective defense against these attacks is longer
times-to-live for cache entries, perhaps 30 minutes, in recursive and local DNS
servers [41]. If local entries are cached longer, there will be fewer queries and
retries made to authoritative servers. There are many good reasons for DNS
cache entries with short times-to-live, but these can be changed as an adaptive
measure during attacks. The same idea would work for many other services
with caching.
SYN floods (§2.1.1) are such a serious problem that several specialized tech-
niques have been developed for reducing server work per SYN, and these may
be in use at all times rather than turned on just during attacks. In a “SYN
cookie” defense, the server responds to a SYN with a SYN+ACK packet hav-
ing a specially-coded initial sequence number (the cookie). It then discards the
SYN, using no additional resources for it. If the SYN was an attack, it has
caused little damage. If the SYN was legitimate, on the other hand, it will
elicit an ACK from the initiator with the same initial sequence number incre-
mented by one. By decoding the sequence number, the server can reconstruct
the original SYN and then set up a real TCP connection.
There is another resource defense against SYN floods that is less efficient
than SYN cookies, but comes with fewer side-effects (see §5.3.4). This defense
uses a middlebox in the path to a Web server that stores and responds to SYN
packets, but does nothing else with a SYN packet until it receives the ACK that
completes the handshake. On receiving the ACK, the middlebox forms a new
session by sending the SYN to the server, and subsequently acts as a transparent
forwarder between the two sessions. If the middlebox does not receive a timely
ACK, then the SYN packet was part of an attack or the client has failed, so the
middlebox drops it.
Viewed globally, dynamic resource allocation is not much different from
static allocation, so its interactions with other aspects of networking are al-
ready understood. As indicated, services under attack may be available in some
locations and not in others.
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7 Compound sessions and overlays for security
Like cryptographic protocols, compound session and overlays are mechanisms
employed by users to defend themselves against spying and tampering attacks
(§2.1.4). Cryptography alone is not sufficient because it does not conceal packet
headers.
The focus of this section is on middleboxes. Traffic filters are middleboxes,
inserted by networks into session paths by means of routing. In §3.4.2 we saw
that users can also insert middleboxes into their session paths, by introducing
proxies that form the endpoints of simple sessions in a compound session. Packet
headers within simple sessions must be correct so that packets are delivered,
but the end-to-end identity of a compound session is concealed by its multiple
headers.
Proxies have a lot of power: they can perform many kinds of computation on
packets, so that packets in two associated simple sessions need not correspond
one-to-one. They can even translate from one session protocol to another, so
that two associated simple sessions use different protocols. A proxy can get
the name of the next proxy or endpoint in the compound session by using the
session protocol to engage in a dialogue with the initiator.
Spying and tampering attacks can be launched by other user members of a
network (authorized or unauthorized), and, most importantly, by infrastructure
members of a network performing traffic filtering. Thus the entire topic of this
section can be seen as an interaction between two patterns, namely compound
sessions and traffic filtering.
Compound sessions are useful in many situations, but they have some limita-
tions. After covering compound sessions, we will introduce overlays for security.
These use explicit layering to create implicit compound sessions, and can do
more for users than compound sessions alone.
7.1 Compound sessions
7.1.1 Proxies in access networks
Perhaps the oldest example of a proxy for evading traffic filtering is an “applica-
tion gateway,” which is installed in a private IP network for the benign purpose
of evading the too-simple filtering imposed by a firewall. For example, an enter-
prise firewall may block all outgoing sessions except Web accesses. However, the
enterprise may also wish to allow outgoing sessions of another kind, when they
are initiated by specific users. The firewall cannot enforce this policy because
it does not know the mapping between internal IP names and users (and the
mapping may not even be static).
An application gateway for the application, for instance Telnet, solves this
problem, as shown in Figure 19. To use it, a user initiates a Telnet session to
the application gateway inside the enterprise network. The gateway is a Telnet
proxy. By means of an extension to the Telnet protocol, which is embedded
in TCP, the user supplies a password to authenticate himself to the gateway,
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and also the name of the real Telnet acceptor. The gateway initiates a Telnet
session to the real acceptor outside the enterprise network, and joins the two
simple sessions in a compound session. The enterprise firewall allows outgoing
Telnet sessions from the application gateway only.
initiator Telnetgateway acceptor
V PGW
private IP network public Internet
src = V, dst = GW,
dstPort = 23
src = GW, dst = P,
dstPort = 23
compound TCP session
rewall
Figure 19: A Telnet application gateway inside the access network of V .
In this example, the operator of the enterprise network is cooperating with
the user by providing the gateway. For the operator, it is easier and more
efficient to provide the required user functions with an application gateway
than with a greatly-enhanced firewall.
In a similarly cooperative situation, the operator of a private network might
provide a proxy (with a public name) that session initiators outside the network
can connect to. The proxy authenticates the initiator as deserving the rights
of members of the private network. Then, through the proxy, the initiator can
connect to any member of the private network.
7.1.2 Proxies in transit networks
A user can evade filtering in his access network more easily by connecting to a
friendly proxy in another network. This will be illustrated by the use of a proxy
to reach a Web server. This kind of proxy is sometimes called a “virtual private
network.”4
In Figure 20 a secure dynamic link in a Web-based application network
is implemented by a compound TLS session in bridged IP networks. First the
browser’s request causes initiation of a TLS session with a friendly proxy outside
the client’s access network. A proxied TLS session is like a normal TLS session
except that: (i) instead of looking up the domain name dangerous.com and
using its IP name as the destination of the session, the client’s IP interface
uses the proxy’s IP name as the destination of the session; (ii) the client’s IP
interface expects and verifies the certificate of the proxy, not the Web site; (iii)
the proxy decrypts the HTTP request in the TLS data, looks up the domain
name, and uses the result of the lookup as the destination of an outgoing TLS
session. After this the proxy relays packets between the two simple sessions of
the compound TLS session (note that the proxy must decrypt and re-encrypt
4Calling a proxy a network is a misnomer. See §7.2.2 for the real thing.
51
the data in each packet, because symmetric keys in the two simple sessions are
different).
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Figure 20: A proxied TLS session protects the client’s privacy in his access network,
and provides anonymity at the Web server.
Because of the compound session formed by the proxy, the client’s access
network does not know what server the client is connected to, so the client has
privacy from spying and tampering in his access network. The client also has
anonymity at the server, because the server has no information about the client.
One disadvantage of this mechanism is that the client has no privacy from
the proxy. Another disadvantage comes from the fact that the names of helpful
proxies are usually publicly available (so users can find them), which means that
they are available to the user’s adversaries as well. Consequently, if the clients’s
access network is censoring the network activity of its users, it can simply block
packets destined for external proxies. These disadvantages are addressed in
subsequent sections.
The proxy in Figure 20 is specialized to handle TLS sessions. There can
be proxies for other session protocols as well. For example, a “recursive” DNS
resolver is just a proxy for the simple request/response session protocol used for
DNS lookups. ODNS [49] is a proposal for improving the privacy of users doing
lookups by introducing a proxy between local DNS resolvers and authoritative
resolvers.
To introduce the proxy, as shown in Figure 21, the user appends—to the
domain name it intends to send in its request—the extra high-level domain name
.odns. This will cause a local DNS resolver to send the request to an ODNS
proxy. To conceal the true desired domain D from the local DNS resolver, the
user generates a symmetric key k, encrypts D with k, and encrypts k with the
public key K of ODNS proxies. A concatenation of these two values is the
domain name it sends in its request. The ODNS proxy decrypts with its private
key to get k, and then decrypts with k to get D. After getting a response from
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an authoritative server for D, with an IP name N for D, it encrypts both D
and N with k, and sends them in a response to the local DNS resolver. As a
result of this design, the local DNS resolver will not know what domain name is
being looked up, and the ODNS resolver will not know the identity of the user.
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Figure 21: Oblivious DNS lookup for user privacy.
7.1.3 Deflection
The problem that a censoring access network can block packets to known proxies
has been addressed by several similar proposals [26, 28, 55]. They all use proxies,
but in a way that still works despite the blocking.
A typical compound session in these proposals is shown in Figure 22. The
access network of the session initiator is filtering out packets from users to
certain destinations, represented here by the “covert destination.” The initiator
cannot evade this censorship by using a false source name, because then replies
from the destination will not be delivered to the initiator (also, the network may
be blocking everyone’s access to the site). The critical mechanism is that session
packets are routed through a friendly network where a forwarder recognizes that
the packets must be treated specially, and deflects them to a proxy similar to
the proxy in Figure 20.
overt
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Figure 22: A deflected session between an initiator and a covert destination. In the
simple session on the left, names in the IP header are those of the initiator and overt
destination; packets from the initiator are deflected to the proxy as an exception to
normal forwarding.
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For deflection to work, the initiator must give a hidden signal to the de-
flecting forwarder—one that the censoring network is unlikely to recognize—so
the deflecting forwarder knows which packets to deflect. In Cirripede [26], the
user registers with the friendly network; while the registration is active, all ses-
sions initiated by the user are deflected. In decoy routing [28], this is done on
a session-by-session basis. Decoy routing assumes that the initiator and proxy
share a secret key, which is combined by the initiator with time-varying infor-
mation to form a hidden detection signal for a session. The signal goes into a
pseudo-random field of the first TLS packet. The decoy-routing system has the
same information as all the initiators, so it can tell the deflecting forwarders
which signals to look for at the current time.
In Figure 22, the TLS-based session protocol between the initiator and the
proxy is complex. When the proxy first receives session packets, it initiates a
TLS session to the overt destination. The TLS handshake is completed end-
to-end between initiator and overt destination, so that all packets (including
a certificate in plaintext) look normal to the censoring network. Once packet
data can be encrypted, the proxy signals to the initiator that it is in the session
path, terminates the session to the overt destination, gets the name of the covert
destination from the initiator, initiates a session to the covert destination, and
relays packets between the client and covert destination. During the entire
compound session, the packets seen by the censoring filter will have the overt
destination in their source or destination field.
The final problem to be solved is the placement of deflection forwarders in
friendly networks. This can be viewed as a game between the censoring network
(and its friends) and the session participants (and their friends). The adminis-
trator of the censoring network would like its outgoing packets to reach all or
most of the public Internet without passing through a network with deflection
forwarding.
The Cirripede proposal favors deflection forwarders in networks close to the
censoring network, so that many paths from the censoring network go through
friendly networks, and the censoring network would suffer too much if it stopped
bridging to friendly networks. The decoy routing proposal favors widespread
deflection forwarders, in particular, in friendly networks close to a variety of
important overt destinations. This way an initiator in the censored network
can try several overt destinations until it finds one with deflection in the path,
which it knows when the proxy signals its presence after the TLS handshake.
In this game BGP inter-network routing helps the endpoints more than the
censoring network, because it gives the censoring network only a single route to
each destination.
The rules of this game may change in the future: networks may be willing to
give some path-selection control to cooperating networks and even user mem-
bers, both of which are recommended by the SCION project [6]. Both now and
in the future, when it comes to security contests, it matters who (and where)
your friends are. Social forces will shape the Internet in their image, by defining
its interest groups and alliances.
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7.2 Overlays
An overlay is a virtual network layered on top of an underlay network (§3.3).
We will first summarize the differences between overlays and compound sessions,
then show their use in three security designs.
7.2.1 Overlays versus compound sessions
Figure 23 shows a prototypical overlay session whose links are implemented
by sessions in one or more bridged underlay networks. All four machines are
user members of their underlay networks. From the viewpoint of the underlay
networks, this looks very similiar to a compound session with three simple ses-
sions connecting user members. Yet the sessions in the underlay are completely
independent of one another (b and c are not proxies), and the overlay offers
additional structures that are often useful, as follows:
• The overlay has its own namespace. Overlay names can be the same as
in the underlays, but new names are useful for multiple purposes. For
example, a member of a private IP network with a private, unreachable
name can have a public, reachable name in an overlay.
• The overlay has its own routing. Overlay routing can insert application-
specific middleboxes. In security designs, routing in an overlay is often
used to vary and conceal packet paths.
• The overlay has its own session protocols. We’ll see a good use of this in
§7.2.4.
• The overlay has its own (geographical) span. It can unite allies in remote
underlay networks.
• Sessions in the overlay and underlays have different durations. Overlay
links—implemented by underlay sessions—are often long-lived and reused
by many overlay sessions, which minimizes setup time and computational
overhead (as in §4.4.2).
7.2.2 Virtual private networks
Strictly speaking, “virtual private networks” (VPNs) are not networks, but
rather a technology for widening the geographic span of a private IP network
such as an enterprise network. With VPN technology, an enterprise network is
composed with other public and private IP networks in two ways simultaneously:
(i) as usual, it is bridged with them, and (ii) it is layered on them, because
some links of the enterprise network are implemented by sessions spanning other
public and private IP networks. These relationships are illustrated by Figure 24.
In the figure, there is a TCP session between an enterprise machine and
an employee laptop currently located in a coffee shop. The enterprise-network
member on the laptop is described as a “VPN interface,” because it is an IP
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Figure 23: A prototypical overlay session.
interface plus VPN client. Before initiating the TCP session, it must first create
a secure dynamic link to a VPN server in the enterprise network. To create the
dynamic link, the laptop’s VPN interface requests that its IP interface make
an ESP session (§4.3) to public IP name PS. The employee must also enter
a password to authenticate his identity to the VPN server. The ESP session
happens to be compound, because it goes through a Network Address Translator
(similar to a proxy) in the coffee shop’s private IP network.
Viewed as an overlay network, the enterprise network uses VPN technology
to allow a laptop in an insecure location to participate fully in the enterprise
network. Most importantly, the VPN server assigns the laptop’s member the
name V5 in the network’s private namespace. This name can be chosen ac-
cording to the privileges the laptop’s owner has within the enterprise network.
Consequently, traffic filters in the enterprise network can see from the source
and destination fields of packets which policies should apply to the laptop’s
sessions, and enforce them accordingly.
7.2.3 Overlays for default-reject filtering
In §5.1.3 we introduced default-reject filtering (filtering in which the default ac-
tion on a packet is to drop it) as an interesting technique with limited applica-
bility, because of the difficulty of finding precise filtering criteria. Default-reject
filtering is similar in spirit to capabilities, introduced in §5.2.3, but it turned out
that denial of capability is as much of a problem as denial of service. Several
researchers have explored whether the properties of overlays can be exploited
to make a success of default-reject filtering.
In both Mayday [1] and Secure Overlay Services (SOS) [30], the initiator
of a session is authenticated, and session packets are not transmitted unless
authentication succeeds. To understand these proposals, it is best to imagine
the perspective of an access network that is trying to protect a Web server within
the network from flooding attacks. The obvious problem with authentication at
the edge of the access network is that the authenticators are a limited resource,
easily overcome by denial-of-capability attacks. Mayday and SOS use overlays
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to extend the geographical span of the access network, enlisting allies all over the
public Internet to perform authentication. The authenticators are the overlay
ingress nodes in Figure 25. The idea is that there can be enough authenticators,
dispersed widely enough, to resist flooding and denial-of-capability attacks. This
is upstream filtering (§5.2.2) in the overlay network.
The general idea of Mayday and SOS is that packets of authenticated sessions
travel to the protected target through the overlay as well as the Internet. Traffic
filters near the protected target can distinguish overlay packets, and discard all
other incoming packets. Details are given below.
These proposals make use of another overlay property in addition to flexible
span: because an overlay is a network, it has its own routing. Overlay routing
is used to vary and hide the paths of packets between ingress members and
the target. This keeps attackers from flooding the paths to the target rather
than the target itself. For instance, SOS uses a complex routing scheme, with
long paths computed from distributed hash tables, for path secrecy. Other
implications of overlay routing will be discussed further below.
In designing an overlay network for default-reject filtering, there are three
important choices to be made. SOS makes specific choices, while the Mayday
paper points out that there are other choices, and evaluates some combinations
of them. We now explain the three choices.
Source authentication
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This choice concerns how a session initiator finds an ingress member and
authenticates itself to the overlay as a source of legimate packets. SOS is in-
tended for use during an emergency situation, when networks are so congested
that even benign ordinary traffic must be dropped. The members of SOS are
hosted by a peer group of machines cooperating to provide emergency services.
The only allowed packets to a given destination come from a few pre-configured
sources used by emergency responders. So in SOS the source is itself an overlay
member, i.e., it has special software. SOS source members know the Internet
names of many ingress members, well-distributed so that they cannot all be
overwhelmed by flooding attacks. It creates a secure link to an ingress member,
using ESP with endpoint authentication.
Mayday emphasizes an authentication option that is architecturally more
complex, but has broader applicability because the source need not be an overlay
member (both Figures 25 and 26 depict this option). In this option packets from
a source to target name T are routed to some machine with an ingress member
of the overlay. This can be accomplished by IP anycast, which will route packets
from any source to the destination with name T closest to them. The underlay
IP interface accepts the TCP session and passes control to the ingress member,
which can then authenticate the source by asking for a user name and password
associated with the target service. If the source is authentic, the ingress member
initiates a TCP session through the overlay to the target; these two TCP sessions
then become two parts of a compound application session.
Note from Figure 26 that the target server receives as source name the
underlay name of the initiator. This means that reverse packets, from the Web
server to the initiator, do not travel through the overlay. Although the path of
return packets is not shown in the figure, both SOS and Mayday work like this.
Lightweight authenticator
In addition to the overlay network, a potential target must be surrounded in
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the Internet underlay by a ring of ordinary traffic filters. These ordinary filters,
such as firewalls, must have the capacity to handle flooding attacks, and must
be configurable by overlay machines or by people administering the overlay.
Figure 26 is a session view of allowed access to protected target T . The
last overlay hop between an egress member of the overlay and the target is
implemented by an underlay path that goes through a filter. The lightweight
authenticator is the attribute of underlay packets from an egress member to
the target that causes the traffic filter to recognize them as overlay packets and
allow them to pass. The simplest lightweight authenticator is the IP name of
the egress member (here E) in the source field of a packet; this is what SOS
uses. Other authenticators proposed by Mayday include the destination port,
destination name, and other header fields whose contents can be manipulated
by the egress member.
The critical property of a lightweight authenticator is that it must be a
secret—if attackers knew it, they could simply send underlay packets that match
it. You might think that the destination name is the worst possible authenti-
cator, but it can be a good one if the underlay name of the protected target is
different from its overlay name, as shown in Figure 26, and if it can be changed
easily and frequently by local control in the target’s access network.
Overlay routing
In addition to hiding whole packet paths, overlay routing keeps the identities
of egress nodes secret, which is indispensable if the lightweight authenticator is
the name of an egress node. SOS uses egress names as authenticators; this is
safe because of its elaborate overlay routing.
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Mayday takes the position that effective overlay routing can be much sim-
pler, with options including no routing at all (ingress and egress nodes are the
same), and singly-indirect routing (one hop between ingress and egress nodes, as
in Figure 26). The Mayday paper reports on analysis showing that certain com-
binations of overlay routing and lightweight authenticator provide “best cases”
for trade-offs among performance and security. For example, it says that de-
signers who want moderate levels of both performance and security should use
singly-indirect routing with any authenticator other than egress name.
7.2.4 Overlays for anonymity
In §7.1.2 we showed how proxies in transit networks can provide session-initiating
users with privacy within their access networks and anonymity at the accept-
ing endpoint. The weakness of this mechanism is that the user has no privacy
whatsoever from the proxy. The purpose of the public service Tor [16, 47] is
to add to the services above a high degree of privacy from the proxies. This
section describes the second, current Tor design [16].
Tor is an overlay network whose infrastructure members reside on the ma-
chines of volunteers world-wide. These infrastructure members are fully con-
nected by long-lived links, each of which is implemented by a TLS session in the
public Internet. This covers two of the ways Tor makes use of overlay properties:
its membership unites allies across the globe, and its links are long-lived and
reused by many overlay sessions (which minimizes setup time and computational
overhead).
An infrastructure member in Tor acts as a proxy within the overlay. Users
also have Tor members on their machines. Each proxy has a public key, which
it uses (along with a certificate) to authenticate itself when setting up links by
means of TLS sessions.5
Tor is layered between application networks and the public Internet. Appli-
cations use the same interface to get TLS service from Tor as they would from
the public Internet. User members query Tor directory servers to get lists of
available proxies, each described by its public key, IP name, and policies.
To make a TLS session for an application (when there is no prior state in
place), a Tor member first chooses a random route through several Tor proxies
(this is why the proxies themselves do no routing). As with other overlay routing
schemes, this varies and conceals packet paths. Next the user member creates
a compound session in Tor that goes through the chosen proxies, as shown in
Figure 27. The session protocol is the Tor “circuit” protocol, and each simple
session is a Tor circuit with its own circuit identifier.
The important thing about circuits is that each one has a unique security
association with the user member that created it. To make the compound session
in Figure 27, the user first creates a simple session (circuit) to A, and executes a
key-exchange protocol with A, so that each now knows a shared symmetric key
KUA. Next the user uses circuit(UA) to send to A an extend command telling
5In Tor terminology, a proxy is an “onion router” and a user member is an “onion proxy.”
But Tor proxies do no routing, and user members do no proxying.
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Figure 27: A compound session made by Tor. The first three simple sessions use the
Tor circuit protocol, and go through the Tor network. The last simple session uses
TCP, and goes through the public Internet.
it to create a new circuit to proxy B. Through the two associated circuits, U
and B execute a key-exchange protocol, after which each has a shared key KUB .
Finally U tells B to extend the compound session by creating a new circuit to
C, with U/C key exchange. Once a compound session has been assembled in
Tor, it can be used to carry many TLS application sessions. In the background,
the compound session is reconfigured piece-by-piece about once a minute, to
confuse adversarial observers who are analyzing traffic patterns.6
Tor users use the security associations to conceal packet data from all except
the last Tor proxy. The data transmitted on each circuit is multiply-encrypted
as shown in the figure. When A receives a packet from U , it decrypts it before
forwarding it to B, but it cannot read the packet because it is doubly encrypted
with keys KUB and KUC that are unknown to A. For a similar reason, B
cannot read it either.
To understand the rest of the Tor design, it is necessary to consider TLS as a
separate protocol embedded inside TCP. Tor has a second session protocol, the
stream protocol, which is embedded in the circuit protocol. Figure 28 shows all
the session protocols, with protocols above embedded in protocols below, used
for a single TLS application session through Tor.
The stream protocol substitutes for TCP within Tor; there is a one-to-one
correspondence between external TCP sessions and Tor streams, and TCP data
is simply reformatted for streams. There are two reasons for using streams
instead of TCP inside Tor: (i) if the data sent on Tor circuits were TCP packets,
then proxy C would see their source and destination fields in plaintext; (ii) the
reliable, ordered packet delivery of TCP is not required within Tor, because all
of its links are implemented by TLS, and already have these properties.
When C has received enough stream packets to carry an HTTPS request
6Spies know that Tor sessions are deliberately concealed, so they have reason to analyze
side-channels such as packet timing and sizes. These attacks can be successful in correlating
packet streams coming into and out of Tor. Note that the adversarial observers can be Tor
proxies, too.
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with a domain name, it can complete the compound session end-to-end. It
sends a TCP SYN packet with its own IP name as source and the IP name
of the domain name as destination. After the TCP handshake, it continues
converting data packets between the TCP and stream-protocol formats, and
forwarding them in both directions. The TLS handshake between U and the
server goes end-to-end, so that U can validate the server’s certificate, and so
that even C does not see plaintext packet data.
Tor is a complex network in its own right. We have seen that it has its own
session protocols, compound sessions, and routing. It also has internal mecha-
nisms for denial-of-service protection and congestion control. Rate-limiting can
be managed on circuits or on streams.
Unfortunately the Tor design for privacy has one serious deficiency, which
is the fact that the final acceptor of the TCP session can know that Tor is
being used, because there are readily accessible lists of Tor nodes. Fraudsters,
spammers, and other criminals are big users of Tor, along with law-abiding
people in need of privacy. Consequently an increasing number of services are
rejecting or otherwise discriminating against Tor users [31]. Tor protects the
reputation of its volunteer machines by allowing them to restrict their exiting
TCP sessions or refuse to be exit proxies. Some volunteers must shoulder this
burden, however, or the service will not be available to those who really need it.
Although the Tor-exit problem appears to have no solution in today’s Inter-
net, privacy is so valuable that some researchers propose to replace much of IP
with the concepts of Tor [36]. If the use of Tor became much more widespread
as this proposal argues it should, then the stigma of using Tor would fade away.
8 Conclusion
Modeling and security are tightly intertwined. Given a rigorous model of a net-
work, security attacks, and defenses, we can reason rigorously or even formally
that the defenses will prevent the attacks—or at least mitigate them. Where
there are gaps in the model, i.e., possible real-world behaviors that the model
does not describe, there are possible attacks against which the defenses are
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useless.
As networks have become increasingly important in most aspects of daily life,
their complexity has grown in proportion, and the early models have become
increasingly inadequate. In this tutorial we have used a new, compositional
model, which emphasizes that there are many networks in an overall network
architecture, each one being a microcosm of all the basic aspects of network-
ing. Because all networks are similar in important ways, they can be modeled
with common structures and common compositional interfaces. This modular-
ity greatly expands the range of network behaviors that can be modeled without
overwhelming complexity [58].
In this tutorial, the new model has enabled us to find a new and useful
classification of security attacks, and to explain all common defenses by means
of just four patterns. There is a clear relationship between the attack categories
and the defense patterns, because the categories are based on which agents
are the attackers, defenders, and potential victims, and some defenses are only
available to some defenders.
The model has also helped us understand how the patterns interact with each
other and with other aspects of networking, which is a dimension of security that
has received little prior attention. Nevertheless it is essential, because networks
must satisfy many goals simultaneouly, and designers cannot succeed if they are
ignorant of the consequences of their decisions.
The modeling and defenses in this tutorial are obviously not complete, yet
we believe that any progress toward organized thinking about network security
will be helpful for building defenses and—ultimately—making verifiable claims
about network security. It has been shown that real software can be made
secure with modularity and verified components [33], and the world is sure to
demand this level of assurance from more and more computer systems, including
networks.
References
[1] D. G. Andersen. Mayday: Distributed filtering for Internet services. In
Proceedings of the 4th USENIX Symposium on Internet Technologies and
Systems, 2003.
[2] D. G. Andersen, H. Balakrishnan, N. Feamster, T. Koponen, D. Moon, and
S. Shenker. Accountable Internet Protocol (AIP). In Proceedings of ACM
SIGCOMM, 2008.
[3] Arbor Networks. NETSCOUT Arbor’s 13th annual worldwide infras-
tructure security report. https://pages.arbornetworks.com/rs/
082-KNA-087/images/13th_Worldwide_Infrastructure_Security_
Report.pdf.
63
[4] K. Argyraki and D. R. Cheriton. Active Internet traffic filtering: Real-time
response to denial-of-service attacks. In Proceedings of the USENIX Annual
Technical Conference, 2005.
[5] K. Argyraki and D. R. Cheriton. Network capabilities: The good, the
bad, and the ugly. In Proceedings of the 4th Workshop on Hot Topics in
Networks, 2005.
[6] D. Barrera, L. Chuat, A. Perrig, R. M. Reischuk, and P. Szalachowski. The
SCION Internet architecture. Communications of the ACM, 60(6):56–65,
June 2017.
[7] R. Beckett, A. Gupta, R. Mahajan, and D. Walker. A general approach
to network configuration verification. In Proceedings of ACM SIGCOMM,
2017.
[8] R. Beckett, R. Mahajan, T. Millstein, J. Padhye, and D. Walker. Don’t
mind the gap: Bridging network-wide objectives and device-level configu-
rations. In Proceedings of ACM SIGCOMM, 2016.
[9] M. S. Blumenthal and D. D. Clark. Rethinking the design of the Internet:
The end-to-end arguments vs. the brave new world. ACM Transactions on
Internet Technology, 1(1):70–109, August 2001.
[10] R. Canetti. Universally Composable Security: A new paradigm for crypto-
graphic protocols. https://eprint.iacr.org/2000/067.pdf, 2019. Ac-
cessed 15 October 2019.
[11] M. Casado, M. J. Freedman, J. Pettit, J. Luo, N. McKeown, and S. Shenker.
Ethane: Taking control of the enterprise. In Proceedings of SIGCOMM.
ACM, August 2007.
[12] Center for Applied Internet Data Analysis. Archipelago monitor statis-
tics. https://www.caida.org/projects/ark/statistics/. Accessed 29
November 2019.
[13] D. D. Clark. The design philosophy of the DARPA Internet protocols. In
Proceedings of SIGCOMM. ACM, August 1988.
[14] D. D. Clark. Designing an Internet. Information Policy Series, MIT Press,
2018.
[15] D. D. Clark, J. Wroclawski, K. R. Sollins, and R. Braden. Tussle in cy-
berspace: Defining tomorrow’s Internet. IEEE/ACM Transactions on Net-
working, 13(3):462–475, June 2005.
[16] R. Dingledine, N. Mathewson, and P. Syverson. Tor: The second-generation
onion router. In Proceedings of the 13th USENIX Security Symposium,
2004.
64
[17] Dyn analysis summary of Friday October 21 attack.
https://dyn.com/blog/dyn-analysis-summary-of-friday-october-21-
attack/. Accessed 10 November 2018.
[18] A. Fogel, S. Fung, L. Pedrosa, M. Walraed-Sullivan, R. Govindan, R. Ma-
hajan, and T. Millstein. A general approach to network configuration anal-
ysis. In Proceedings of the 12th USENIX Conference on Networked Systems
Design and Implementation, 2015.
[19] M. Georgiev, S. Iyengar, S. Jana, R. Anubhai, D. Boneh, and V. Shmatikov.
The most dangerous code in the world: Validating SSL certificates in non-
browser software. In ACM Conference on Computer and Communications
Security, 2012.
[20] S. Goldwasser, Y. Kalai, R. A. Popa, V. Vaikuntanathan, and N. Zeldovich.
Reusable garbled circuits and succinct functional encryption. In Proceedings
of Symposium on Theory of Computing. ACM, 2013.
[21] T. Grandison and M. Sloman. A survey of trust in Internet applications.
IEEE Communications Surveys and Tutorials, 3(4):2–16, 2000.
[22] M. Handley. Why the Internet only just works. BT Technology Journal,
24(3):119–129, July 2006.
[23] M. Handley, V. Paxson, and C. Kreibich. Network intrusion detection:
Evasion, traffic normalization, and end-to-end protocol semantics. In Pro-
ceedings of the 10th USENIX Security Symposium, 2001.
[24] How does TLS affect MQTT performance? https://www.hivemq.com/
blog/how-does-tls-affect-mqtt-performance/. Accessed 19 September 2018.
[25] O. Honda, H. Ohsaki, M. Imase, M. Ishizuka, and J. Murayama. TCP over
TCP: Effects of TCP tunneling on end-to-end throughput and latency. In
Proceedings of SPIE, volume 6011, pages 138–146. International Society for
Optical Engineering, 2005.
[26] A. Houmansadr, G. T. K. Nguyen, M. Caesar, and N. Borisov. Cirri-
pede: Circumvention infrastructure using router redirection with plausible
deniability. In Proceedings of the ACM Conference on Computer and Com-
munications Security, 2011.
[27] ITU. Information Technology—Open Systems Interconnection—Basic Ref-
erence Model: The basic model. ITU-T Recommendation X.200, 1994.
[28] J. Karlin, D. Ellard, A. W. Jackson, C. E. Jones, G. Lauer, D. P. Mankins,
and W. T. Strayer. Decoy routing: Toward unblockable Internet com-
munication. In Proceedings of the USENIX Workshop on Free and Open
Communications on the Internet. USENIX, 2011.
65
[29] P. Kazemian, M. Chang, H. Zeng, G. Varghese, N. McKeown, and
S. Whyte. Real time network policy checking using Header Space Analy-
sis. In Proceedings of the 10th USENIX Conference on Networked Systems
Design and Implementation, 2013.
[30] A. D. Keromytis, V. Misra, and D. Rubenstein. SOS: Secure Overlay Ser-
vices. In Proceedings of SIGCOMM. ACM, August 2002.
[31] S. Khattak, D. Fifield, S. Afroz, M. Javed, S. Sundaresan, V. Paxson, S. J.
Murdoch, and D. McCoy. Do you see what I see? Differential treatment of
anonymous users. In Proceedings of the Network and Distributed Security
Symposium. Internet Society, 2016.
[32] T. Kiravuo, M. Sarela, and J. Manner. A survey of Ethernet LAN security.
IEEE Communications Surveys & Tutorials, 15(3):1477–1491, 2013.
[33] G. Klein, J. Adronick, M. Fernandez, I. Kuz, T. Murray, and G. Heiser.
Formally verified software in the real world. Communications of the ACM,
61(10):68–77, October 2018.
[34] A. Langley et al. The QUIC transport protocol: Design and Internet-scale
deployment. In Proceedings of ACM SIGCOMM, 2017.
[35] N. Li, B. N. Grosof, and J. Feigenbaum. Delegation logic: A logic-based
approach to distributed authorization. ACM Transactions on Information
and System Security, 6(1):128–171, February 2003.
[36] V. Liu, S. Han, A. Krishnamurthy, and T. Anderson. Tor instead of IP. In
Proceedings of the 11th Workshop on Hot Topics in Networks, 2011.
[37] N. P. Lopes, N. Bjorner, P. Godefroid, K. Jayaraman, and G. Varghese.
Checking beliefs in dynamic networks. In Proceedings of the 12th USENIX
Conference on Networked Systems Design and Implementation, 2015.
[38] R. Mahajan, S. Bellovin, S. Floyd, J. Ioannidis, V. Paxson, and S. Shenker.
Controlling high bandwidth aggregates in the network. Computer Commu-
nication Review, 32(3):62–73, July 2002.
[39] B. Marczak, N. Weaver, J. Dalek, R. Ensafi, D. Fifield, S. McKune, A. Rey,
J. Scott-Railton, R. Deibert, and V. Paxson. An analysis of China’s “Great
Cannon”. In USENIX Workshop on Free and Open Communications on
the Internet, August 2015.
[40] C. Meadows. The NRL protocol analyzer: An overview. Journal of Logic
Programming, 26(2):113–131, February 1996.
[41] G. C. M. Moura, J. Heidemann, M. Muller, R. de O. Schmidt, and
M. Davids. When the dike breaks: Dissecting DNS defenses during DDoS.
In Proceedings of the ACM Internet Measurement Conference, 2018.
66
[42] M. Nasr, A. Houmansadr, and A. Mazumdar. Compressive traffic analy-
sis: A new paradigm for scalable traffic analysis. In ACM Conference on
Computer and Communications Security, 2017.
[43] D. Naylor, A. Finamore, I. Leontiadis, Y. Grunenberger, M. Mellia, M. Mu-
nafo, K. Papagiannaki, and P. Steenkiste. The cost of the ‘S’ in HTTPS.
In Proceedings of ACM CoNEXT, 2014.
[44] D. Naylor, R. Li, C. Gkantsidis, , T. Karagiannis, and P. Steenkiste. And
then there were more: Secure communication for more than two parties.
In Proceedings of ACM CoNEXT, 2017.
[45] D. Naylor, K. Schomp, M. Varvello, I. Leontiadis, J. Blackburn, D. Lopez,
K. Papagiannaki, P. R. Rodriguez, and P. Steenkiste. Multi-context TLS
(mcTLS): Enabling secure in-network functionality in TLS. In Proceedings
of ACM SIGCOMM, 2015.
[46] C. Raiciu, C. Paasch, S. Barre, A. Ford, M. Honda, F. Duchene,
O. Bonaventure, and M. Handley. How hard can it be? designing and
implementing a deployable Multipath TCP. In Networked Systems Design
and Implementation, 2012.
[47] M. G. Reed, P. F. Syverson, and D. M. Goldschlag. Anonymous connections
and onion routing. IEEE Journal on Selected Areas in Communications,
16(4):482–494, May 1998.
[48] S. Savage, D. Wetherall, A. Karlin, and T. Anderson. Practical network
support for IP traceback. In Proceedings of SIGCOMM. ACM, 2000.
[49] P. Schmitt, A. Edmundson, A. Mankin, and N. Feamster. Oblivious DNS:
Practical privacy for DNS queries. arXiv:1806.00276v2, 2018.
[50] Y. Sheffer, R. Holz, and P. Saint-Andre. Summarizing known attacks on
Transport Layer Security (TLS) and Datagram TLS (DTLS). Internet
Engineering Task Force Request for Comments 7457, 2015.
[51] J. Sherry, C. Lan, R. A. Popa, and S. Ratnasamy. BlindBox: Deep packet
inspection over encrypted traffic. In Proceedings of SIGCOMM. ACM, 2015.
[52] R. Sommer and V. Paxson. Outside the closed world: On using machine
learning for network intrusion detection. In Proceedings of the IEEE Sym-
posium on Security and Privacy, 2010.
[53] R. Spreitzer, V. Moonsamy, T. Korak, and S. Mangard. Systematic clas-
sification of side-channel attacks: A case study for mobile devices. IEEE
Communications Surveys & Tutorials, 20(1):465–488, 2018.
[54] J. Vertesi. My experiment opting out of big data made me look like a crim-
inal. https://time.com/83200/privacy-internet-big-data-opt-out.
Accessed 15 October 2019.
67
[55] E. Wustrow, S. Wolchok, I. Goldberg, and J. A. Halderman. Telex: An-
ticensorship in the network infrastructure. In Proceedings of the 20th
USENIX Security Symposium, 2011.
[56] A. Yaar, A. Perrig, and D. Song. Pi: A path identification mechanism to
defend against DDoS attacks. In Proceedings of the Symposium on Security
and Privacy. IEEE, 2003.
[57] X. Yang, D. Wetherall, and T. Anderson. A DoS-limiting network archi-
tecture. In Proceedings of SIGCOMM. ACM, August 2005.
[58] P. Zave and J. Rexford. The compositional architecture of the Internet.
Communications of the ACM, 62(3):78–87, March 2019.
[59] L. Zhang, A. Afanasyev, J. Burke, and V. Jacobson. Named data network-
ing. ACM SIGCOMM Computer Communication Review, 44(3):66–73, July
2014.
68
